Alejandrino v. Quezon Case Digest

Alejandrino v. Quezon
46 Phil 83

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

Petitioner is Jose Alendrino, a senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the 12th denatorial district. Respondents are members of the Philippine Senate including, among others, Manuel Quezon; Faustino Aguilar, Senate Secretary; Bernabe Bustamante, Sgt. At Arms; and Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Senate.

On February 5, 1924, the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent senators adopted a resolution depriving petitioner of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for a period of one year from January 1, 1924. The resolution reads:

Resolved: That petitioner is guilty of disorderly misconduct and flagrant violation of privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Vicente de Vera, senator for the 6th district during the debate regarding the credentials of petitioner;

Resolved further: That petitioner be deprived of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments as senator for one year from January 1, 1924;

Resolved lastly: A copy of the resolution be given to the Governor-General for his information.

Petitioner complained that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entire of no effect. He prays the court to issue a temporary restraining order, to declare said resolution as null and void, and issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against respondents.

The Attorney-General, representing respondents, objected to the jurisdiction of the court.

Issue:

May the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Sen. Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?


Ruling:

No. The writ will not lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. It has been held that where a member has been expelled by a legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

In Severino v. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (prayer for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General to call a special election as provided by law), the Court rules that we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts.

In State of Mississippi v. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States (prayer to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson from executing certain Acts of Congress), the US Supreme Court ruled that the Congress is the Legislative Department; the President is the Executive Department. Neither can be retrained in its action by the Judicial Department, though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance. The US SC has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.
In French v. State of California (prayer for mandamus by duly elected senators to compel the Senate of California to admit them as members), the US SC ruled that the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house therof.

No court has ever held and no court will ever hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any particular action. Also, if the Court does not have any authority to control the Philippine Senate, it has likewise no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the same.

However, the Constitution has purposely withheld from the Legislature and the Governor-General the power to suspend an appointive member. Suspend is not included in the terms “punish” for the Legislature (Organic Act section 18) and “remove” for the Executive (Organic Act sections 16, 17). This is because punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency or representation. Expulsion, the same, while giving the constituency the opportunity to elect anew. But suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded means by which to fill the vacancy.