Mabanag v. Lopez Vito Case Digest

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
78 Phil 1

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the congressional resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto. Petitioners are 8 senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. Petitioners allege that the resolution is contrary to the Constitution.
The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Comelec as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress due to alleged irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition was filed. Consequently, the 3 senators and 8 representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary ¾ vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If the petitioners had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary ¾ vote in either House of Congress.

Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of the enrolled bill/resolution.

Petitioners contend that respondents are confusing jurisdiction (substantive law) with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution (evidence and practice).

Issue:

WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.

WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

Ruling:

No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress. If a political question conslusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.

Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 220, provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings:

By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and

In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals because those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the Court; and it had not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law.

Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2 ways specified in Section 313 of The Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the 2 documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”