OSMENA V. PENDATUN Case Digest

OSMENA V. PENDATUN
109 Phil 863

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

On July 14, 1960, petitioner Congressman Sergio Osmena Jr. filed a petition before the SC against respondents Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and 14 other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by HR 59. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity. The pertinent portions of HR 59 are as follows:

On June 23, 1960, petitioner accused then President Garcia in a privilege speech that “free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. Even pardons are for sale, and the culprit can always be bailed out as long as he can come across with a handsome dole.”
The charges of the petitioner, if made recklessly and without basis, would constitute a serious assault on the dignity and prestige of the Office of the President which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people.

A special committee of 15 members to be appointed by the Speaker is created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President, and is authorized to summon Cong. Osmena to appear before it to substantiate his charges as well as issue subpoena to require attendance of witnesses or production of pertinent papers. If Cong. Osmena fails to do so, require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the special session of Congress.

Petitioner alleged that:

The resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered.
His words constituted no actionable conduct.

After his objectionable speech, the House took up other business, and according to Rule XVII Section 7 of the Rules of the House, if other business has intervened after a Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor.

The House has no power under the Constitution to suspend one of its members.

The majority of the Court decided to hear the case and required respondents to answer without issuing any preliminary injunction. The special committee continued to perform its task, and submitted its report on July 18, 1960 finding petitioner guilty of serious disorderly behavior. The House approved on the same day HR 175, declaring petitioner guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for 15 months.

On July 19, 1960, respondents filed their answer to the instant petition, challenged the jurisdiction of the SC to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld HR 175 and emphasized that since Congress had ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee had ceased to exist.

Issue:

WON the Court can prevent Congress from punishing or disciplining one of its members for his serious allegations against the President in one of his speeches.


Ruling:

Yes.

Parliamentary Immunity under Section 15, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. The same provision in our Constitution was taken from Sec.6 Clause 1 of Article 1 of the US Constitution, and in that country, is has always been understood to mean that though exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, members thereof may nonetheless by questioned in Congress itself.

For unparliamentarily conduct, members of Congress have been censured, imprisoned, suspended, or even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. In fact, the Philippine Senate suspended a senator for 1 year in April 1949.

On whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct, the Court believes that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for adjudication by the courts. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. The Court refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which is their special duty to maintain.

In Clifford v. French, the SC of California ruled that the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department. Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.

Courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and the courts have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In Alejandrino v. Quezon, the Court rules that the Senate had no power to suspend its members because it would be tantamount to removal, and the organic law Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member. HOWEVER, that remark should be understood to refer particularly to an appointive senator. At that time, the Legislature only had those powers which were granted to it by the Jones Law. Now, the Congress has full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation except as restricted by the Constitution, including legislative prerogative of suspension.
However, as the House has already closed its session, the Committee has ceased to exist, and the case should be dismissed for having moot and academic.