Partosa-Jo v. CA
G.R. No. 82606
December 18, 1992
Facts:
Jose Jo is a Chinese national, and Prima Partosa is his legal wife. Jose Jo admitted that he had cohabited with three other women and fathered 15 children. The two agreed that Prima would temporarily leave their conjugal home in Dumaguete City to stay with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. In 1942, Prima went back to Dumaguete, but she was not accepted by her husband.
In 1980, Prima filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as well as for support. The trial court judge rendered the decision granting Prima a monthly support of Php500, Php40,000 for the construction of a house where she may live separately, Php19,200 by way of support in-arrears, and Php3,000 for attorney’s fees. However, the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause for action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
Jose contended that the decision of the trial court could no longer be reviewed by the Court of Appeals because it has long since become final and executory. Prima, on the other hand, argued that a disposition of that case was made in the penultimate paragraph of the decision. It reads:
“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.”
Prima believed this to be the dispositive portion of the case.
Issues:
1. Can the appellate court still rule on the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision?
2. Is Prima Partosa-Jo entitled to a judicial separation of conjugal property?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the drafting of the decision was not exactly careful. Although the petitioner’s counsel should have taken immediate steps in rectifying the ruling, a mere technical defect is not insuperable. It has been ruled that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final.
2. Yes. The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, invoked Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads
Article 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership except that
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(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property.
Article 178 of the Civil Code had been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code at the time of the decision by the Supreme Court. As was ruled in Ramirez v. CA, “an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment.”
Article 128 of the Family Code reads:
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
As early as 1942, Jose had already rejected his wife and refused to give financial support to her. This falls squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, which provides that if at the time of the petition, the spouses had been separated for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable, it should be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property.
Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo’s petition for judicial separation of property is granted.
It's a Ping Thing 