It's a Ping Thing

Llorente v. CA
G.R. No. 124371
November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

Facts:
Lorenzo and Paula Llorente, both Filipinos, were married in 1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States, leaving his wife in the Philippines. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a citizen of the United States. When he came back to the Philippines in 1945, he found out that his wife, Paula, was living with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. The two had a child together. Lorenzo then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951, he filed for divorce in the State of California. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente, a Filipino, in Manila. They were married for 25 years, producing three children. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a last will and testament, giving all his properties to Alicia and their three children. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. In September 4 of the same year, Paula filed for a petition to be the administrator of Lorenzo’s property, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.

Issue:
Is Paula Llorente correct in saying that she is the surviving spouse of Lorenzo and therefore should have a part of the latter’s properties?

Ruling:
No. Lorenzo Llorente had become a United States citizen long before his divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, the execution of his will, and his death. The divorce granted to him in the United States is binding in the Philippines. Therefore, he is no longer bound by marriage to Paula, as the latter contends.

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HO N. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

Facts:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino, was married to Erich Geiling, a German national, in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, there was marital discord between them, and they separated de facto. After more than three years into the marriage, Geiling filed for divorce in Germany, which was granted on January 15, 1986. On June 27, 1986, Geiling filed two cases of adultery against Imelda.

The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines states that in cases of adultery, the complaint should be raised by the offended spouse. However, by the time of filing the case, Geiling had already been divorced from Pilapil.

Issue:
Can the adultery suit filed by Geiling prosper?

Ruling:
No. The law clearly provides that only the offended spouse may complain regarding adultery. Since Geiling and Pilapil were already divorced, the former does not have the legal standing in the case. The divorce was valid in Germany and should also be deemed valid in the Philippines since it was initiated by the foreign spouse.

Van Dorn v. Romillo
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents

Facts:
In 1972, Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino, was married to Richard Upton, a citizen of the United States. After that, they established their residence in the Philippines and had two children. However, in 1982, Alice and Richard were divorced in Nevada, United States. Alice had also remarried in Nevada to Theodore Can Dorn.

In 1983, Upton filed a suit in order to transfer the management of their properties to him, which was considered conjugal property. He contended that since divorce is not recognized in the Philippines, the divorce decree cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

Issue:
Was the divorce obtained by Alice and Richard in Nevada valid in the Philippines?

Ruling:
Yes. Even though Article 15 states that Filipinos should be governed by Philippine laws in matters of status even if they are living abroad, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, and those would be deemed valid in the Philippines if valid in the country where it was executed.

Efren  T. uy, Nelia B. Lee, Rodolfo L. Menes, and Quinciano H. Lui v. Judge Flores
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332
June 25, 2014

EFREN T. UY, NELIA B. LEE, RODOLFO L. MENES and QUINCIANO H. LUI, Complainants,
vs.
JU DGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.

Facts:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lilian Hefti reassigned Mustapha Gandarosa from Cagayan de Oro City to Quezon City. Gandarosa, not amiable to the reassignment, filed a Rule 65 petition with prayer for a TRO before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, under Judge Flores. The judge granted Ganadarosa’s request.

According to the Administrative Code of 1987 in Book V, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Section 26(3), an employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission.

Issue:
Did Judge Flores commit gross ignorance of the law by taking jurisdiction of the case?

Ruling:
Yes. When a law rule is basic, judges should simply apply the law. Anything less is considered gross ignorance of the law. In this case, the law was clear that Gandarosa should have filed the case with the Civil Service Commission, not the Regional Trial Court.

Edna-Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 189516
June 08, 2016

EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners,
v.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TH COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias was married to Colonel Francisco Otamias on 1978. The couple had five children. On September 2000, they separated because of Colonel Otamias’ alleged infidelity. After the separation, their children remained with Edna. She then demanded support equivalent to 75 percent of the colonel’s retirement benefits. However, Colonel Otamias executed an affidavit stating that he can commit only 50 percent of his retirement benefits to his children and wife. Because of this, they entered into a compromise agreement. On February 26, 2003, the colonel executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50 percent of his salary and pension in favor of Edna and his children. Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003, and the agreement had been honored until January 6, 2006. According to Edna, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) decided not to honor the agreement.

Issue:
Did Colonel Otamias’ execution of the Deed of Assignment make him effectively waive his rights to 50 percent of his retirement benefits in favor of his family?

Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 6 of the Civil Code, rights may be waived unless it is contrary to law or public policy. In this case, the waiver was made in order to ensure the support of the retired colonel of his family, a right granted to them by the Family Code. The waiver is in no way contrary to public policy or any law for that matter. Thus, it is deemed to be valid.

People v. Veneracion
G.R. Nos. 119987-88
October 12, 1995

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents

Facts:
On January 31, 1995, Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. According to RA 7659, the punishment for such crime should be death. Judge Lorenzo Veneracion, however, sentenced the accused only to reclusion perpetua. The city prosecutor of Manila then filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty be changed to death as this is in accordance with the law.

Issue:
Can the judge allow any discretion in imposing either the death penalty or reclusion perpetua when the law clearly provides that the former should be imposed?

Ruling:
No. Judges are bound to apply the laws as they are without the privilege of discretion when the law so clearly provides the punishment for crimes. If judges are allowed to do otherwise, the law would become meaningless. Even if the law seems to harsh, judges are bound to abide by them regardless of their religious or political beliefs.

Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply, Inc. v. CA et al.
G.R. No. 102316
June 30, 1997

VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:
On January 16, 1984, Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. entered into an agreement with the Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation. The latter was to deliver the former’s lauan round logs using its vessel, M/V Seven Ambassador. According to their charter, the shipping corporation should not be held liable for loss, split, or breakages and any kind of damage to the cargo. On January 25, 1984, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of logs. Valenzuela then contended that the stipulation in the charter regarding the non-liability of the respondents is void for being contrary to public policy in relation to Article 1745 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Did Valenzuela Hardwood waive its rights for obtaining payment for damages when it entered into the charter?

Ruling:
Yes. The charter entered into by Valenzuela stipulated that the shipping company may not be held liable in case of loss or damage of the cargo. The petitioner cannot reason that the stipulation is contrary to public policy since the nature of the job entails carrying a special cargo, making the common carrier a private carrier. Contrary to the rules regarding public carriers, in a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that the responsibility of the cargo rests solely on the charterer even if the damage was caused by the negligence of the ship captain.

The provisions of the Civil Code regarding common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. And according to American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo becomes a private carrier. In cases where a private carrier is concerned, a stipulation exempting the carrier from liability is valid. The Civil Code provisions on common carrier are not applicable in this case. In addition, while Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, in this case, the job is not imbued with public considerations since the contract affects only the petitioner and respondent.

Pleasantville Development Corporation v. CA et al.
G.R. No. 79688
February 1, 1996

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents

Facts:
Edith Robillo purchased a land from Pleasantville Development Corporation, designated as Lot 9. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico brought the rights of the lot from Robillo. During the purchase, the lot was empty. On March 26, 1974, Wilson Kee brought Lot No. 8 of the same subdivision from CT Torres Enterprises (CTTEI). One of CTTEI’s employees, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kee and his wife to the site and mistakenly pointed to Lot 9 instead of Lot 8. Afterwards, Kee made improvements on Lot 9, constructing a residence, a store, etc. In the contract of sale on installment signed by Kee, it is provided that the vendee shall bear the expenses of whatever consequential change made in the property

Issue:
Did Kee waive his rights against recovering damages resulting from the company’s negligence by signing the contract?

Ruling:
No. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and could not be allowed. Kee was a builder in good faith, honestly thinking that he was making improvements on his own property. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that  “rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public, order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.”

Sanchez et al. v. CA
G.R. No. 108947
September 29, 1997

ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGODRANISE and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.

Facts:
Rosalia Lugod is the only child of Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca. Her father had illegitimate children, herein petitioners. When Maria Villafranca died, Rosalia petitioned for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and father. Before the proceedings could be closed, Juan Sanchez died. His illegitimate children filed a petition for letters of administration of Sanchez’s properties , which was opposed by Rosalia.

On October 30, 1969, Rosalia and the illegitimate children of her father executed a compromise agreement, assisted by their counsels, wherein they agreed to divide the properties. They did so after four drafts. However, on January 19, 1970, petitioners required Rosalia to deliver a deficiency of 24 hectares and/or to set aside the compromise agreement. They contended that the agreement was invalid because it had not been approved by the court. Later, on April 13, 1970, the parties entered into a memorandum of agreement.

Issue:
Was the compromise agreement valid even without the approval of the court?

Ruling:
Yes. A compromise agreement is defined by Article 2028 of the Civil Code as a contract whereby the parties avoid litigation or end one that has already been commenced by making reciprocal concessions. Since it is a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties, and judicial approval is not needed for its perfection. The parties clearly knowingly entered into the contract, it having been signed only after four drafts. In addition, they even entered into a memorandum of agreement that amended the compromise agreement when they realized there were errors in the latter. This clearly shows that they entered into the contract voluntarily.

Allied Banking Corporation v. CA
G.R. No. 124290
January 16, 1998

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, OSCAR D. TANQUECO, LUCIA D. TANQUECOMATIAS RUBEN D. TANQUECO and NESTOR D. TANQUECO, respondents

Facts:
Felimon Tanquenco and Lucia Domingo-Tanquenco owned a lot in Quezon City that they leased to the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation. In its Provision No. 1, the lease contract specifically states that “the term of the lease shall be fourteen years commencing from April 1, 1978, and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee.” Allied constructed a building to be used as its office and, as stipulated, the ownership of the building would be transferred to the lessors upon the contract’s expiration. On February 1988, the lessor spouses executed a deed of donation over the subject property of their four children, herein respondents, who accepted the donation.

On February 13, 1991, the Tanquenco children told Allied that they were no longer interested in extending the lease, but Allied replied that it was exercising its option to renew their lease under the same terms with additional proposals. An action for ejectment was filed against Allied, and the trial court granted the same, declaring Provision No. 1 of the contract void for violating Article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides “The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.”

Issue:
Was Provision No. 1 valid?

Ruling:
Yes. The lease contract was mutually agreed upon and was hence valid and binding on both parties. The fact that the option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not render the provision void for lack of mutuality because the lessor was free not to give the option to the lessee if he so desires. In addition, it is a settled rule that in case of uncertainty in granting extension to a contract of lease, the tenant is favored over the landlord.