It's a Ping Thing

Leal v. IAC
G.R. No. L-65425
November 5, 1987

IRENEO LEAL, JOSE LEAL, CATALINA LEAL, BERNABELA LEAL, VICENTE LEAL EUIOGIA LEAL PATERNO RAMOS, MACARIO DEL ROSARIO, MARGARITA ALBERTO, VICTORIA TORRES, JUSTINA MANUEL, JULIA MANUEL, MELANIA SANTOS, CLEMENTE SAMARIO, MARIKINA VALLEY, INC., MIGUELA MENDOZA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioners,
vs.
TH E HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), and VICENTE SANTIAGO (Substituted by SALUD M. SANTIAGO), respondents

Facts:
On March 21, 1941, a document entitled “Compraventa”, written entirely in Spanish and involving three parcels of land, was executed by the private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, Vicente Santiago and his brother Luis Santiago, in favor of Cirilo Leal, the deceased father of some of the petitioners. It was stated in the document that the lands shall not be sold to any other person except only to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors. However, between 1960 and 1965, the Leals had already mortgaged or leased the lands to their co-petitioners. Sometime before the agricultural year 1966-1967, Vicente Santiago approached the petitioners and offered to repurchase the properties. The petitioners refused.

Issue:
Is the contract stating that the lands should not be sold to any other party except the seller thereof valid?

Ruling:
No. A prohibition to alienate would be a subversion of public policy, which does not favor unwarranted restrictions on the right to ownership. The contract perpetually prohibits the sale of the lands to other parties and is a restriction to ownership, which is contrary to public policy. Even according to Article 1508 of the Civil Code of Spain (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines), the right to repurchase, in the absence of an expressed agreement as to time, shall last four years from the date of the contract. Even if the contract validly vested a right to Santiago, his attempt to repurchase the properties was made only a quarter of a century later, which obviously renders the right expired.

Cui v. Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127
May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee

Facts:
Emeterio Cui was a law student in Arellano University from the school year 1948-1949 up to and including the first semester of his fourth year. During his stay there, Cui received a scholarship from the university for scholastic merit. Before Arellano University gave Cui the scholarship, however, the former was made to sign the following:

“In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University the equivalent of my scholarship cash.”

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, stating that scholarships given to students for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities should be given because of the merits of said students and not merely to keep them in the school.

Francisco Capistrano, the brother of Cui’s mother, was the dean of the college of law of Arellano University, but on Cui’s last semester in law school, Capistrano transferred to the College of Law of Abad Santos University. Wishing to follow his uncle, Cui left Arellano and enrolled in Abad Santos University. When he was about to take the bar exam, Cui needed the transcripts from Arellano, but the latter would not give it to him unless he paid the sum Php1,033.87, the amount he got as scholarship during his enrolment there. Cui had no choice but to pay the same so he could take the bar exam but has since then petitioned the court for the reimbursement of the said amount.

Issue:
Was the provision of the contract between Cui and Arellano University waiving the former’s right to transfer to another school valid?

Ruling:
No. The contract was “repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty.” In Gabriel v. Monte de Piedad, the Court said that “in order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done contravenes some established interest of society or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals.” The policy given by Memorandum No. 38 is a sound policy and therefore should be followed by Arellano University.

Aguillon v. Director of Lands
G.R. No. L-5448
December 16, 1910

SEVERO AGUILLON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, opponents-appellant.

Facts:
On July 29, 1908, Severo Aguillon presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain parcels of land. The Attorney General, however, opposed the registration on November 14, 1908, because he believed that some of those lands belonged to the government. During the trial, the Director of Lands alleged that the plans presented by Aguillon were not in conformity with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1875 of the Philippine Agriculture. The plans in question were prepared and finished on November 10, 1906. On the other hand, Act No. 1875 took effect on July 1, 1908. The petition in the case was presented on July 29, 1908, almost one month after the effectivity of the act.

Issue:
Can Aguillon be made to change his plans to conform to the provisions of Act No. 1875?

Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner-appellee, the Supreme Court ruled that in this case, the law did not have retroactive effect. It is, however, applied to cases which were begun in the Court of Land Registration after its date of effectivity. Moreover, the law was merely procedural, and it is a well-established doctrine that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once so long as it does not affect or change vested rights.

People v. Patalin, et al.
G.R. No. 125539
July 27, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX
MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

Facts:
Alfonso Patalin, Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras were charged with robbery with rape. They committed the crime on August 11, 1984, where the crime charged against them was punishable by death in pursuance to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the 1987 Constitution, through paragraph 1, Section 19 of Article III, abolished the death penalty. Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the case was still at trial. However, on January 1, 1994, Congress restored the death penalty by virtue of RA 7659 or the Death Penalty Law. The accused were found guilty of the crime, and the trial court rendered the decision on June 14, 1995, when RA 7659 had already taken effect.

Issue:
When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to the accused, did that vest them the right so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?

Ruling:
Yes. The abolition of the death penalty by the 1987 Constitution was favorable to the accused, so it was applied retroactively to their case even while still under trial by virtue of Article 22 of the RPC, which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect if they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal even if at the time of the publication of such law the final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is already serving the sentence. This has vested them the right against future restoration of the capital punishment.

According to Gregorio in Fundamentals of Law Review, citing Escalante v. Santos, the penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three stages:
1. When the crime has been committed and the prosecution began
2. When the sentence has been passed but the service has not begun
3. When the sentence is being carried out

People v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 100210
April 1, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.

Facts:
Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700 in 1983. Because he could not be found, the warrant of his arrest remained unserved. Seven years later, on June 5, 1990, he was arrested on the basis of the warrant on the subversion case. During the arrest, an unlicensed gun was found in his possession. He was therefore charged with two crimes, Subversion under RA 1700 and Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD 1866.

However, on September 22, 1992, RA 7636 was enacted. The law totally repealed RA 1700.

Issue:
Can RA 7636 be given retroactive for Tujan?

Ruling:
Yes. In enacting RA 7636, the intent was to abrogate the anti-subversion law. Since Tujan was not a habitual delinquent, a requirement for the application of the law, the republic act may be retroactively applied to his case.

Cawad v. Abad et al.
G.R. No. 207145
July 28, 2015

GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V. APOLINARES, MA. LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN C. CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q. ROSALES, MA. LUISA NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH); and FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Respondents.

Facts:
On March 26, 1992, RA 7305, aka The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into law. On September 3, 2012, the respondents DBM and CSC issued DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe rules on the grant of Step Increments. The joint circular provided that “an official or employee authorized to be granted longevity pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service.” Then on November 29, 2012, DBM and DOH issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 Series of 2012, which provided for the definition of hazard pay and that it may only be granted to public health workers (PHWs) if the nature of their duties and responsibilities actually expose them to danger. It also stated that the longevity pay should be granted only when the following criteria are met:

a. The PHW holds a position in the agency plantilla of regular positions; and
b. He/She has rendered at least satisfactory performance and has not been found guilty of any administrative or criminal case within all rating periods covered by the 5-year period.

In short, the joint circulars diminished and limited the benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.

According to Section 35 of RA 7305, the rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the act should take effect only after thirty days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The DBM-DOH joint circular was made effective on January 1, 2013, just three days after it was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December 29, 2012.

Issue:
Was the joint circular valid despite it not meeting the publication requirement of RA 7305?

Ruling:
Yes. The joint circular did not modify, amend, or supplant the revised IRR. It gave no real consequences to what the law itself has already prescribed. As an exception to the rule on publication, interpretative regulations which “need nothing further than their bare issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself already prescribed” need not be published. These kinds of regulations do not need to be published to be effective since they do not add anything to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.

Municipal Government of Coron v. Cariño
G.R. No. L-65894
September 24, 1987

THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON, PALAWAN, duly represented by MAYOR RICARDO F. LIM, petitioner,
vs.
JO SE CARINO, VICTORIANO DACULLA, BEN GUMASING, LUCENA CRUZ, HILARIA YALON, PEPITO YAMBAO, RIC GACUTAN, ANDRES DACULLA, FELICISIMA URSAIS, PASTOR JOSOL, TEDDY ACTANG CANDIDA MANALO, LETICIA RAMAL, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES PORFIRIO V. SISON, ABDULWAHID A. BIDIN MARCELINO R. VELOSO and DESIDERIO P. JURADO, respondents.

Facts:
Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the municipality of Coron, Palawan, seeking the authority to demolish the structures built by private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioner’s wharf. The hearings were scheduled, but the respondents continued postponing them. The court then set the final dates of the hearing, allowing no further postponements, on March 20, 21, and 22, 1979. The respondents still did not appear, and their absence was taken as a waiver of their rights to cross-examine the witnesses and to present evidence. The court then rendered a decision to allow the municipality to demolish the defendants’ structures.

The defendants appealed but failed to submit the required 40 copies of their record on appeal even after the appellate court granted an extension of 60 days. Because of this, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the respondents’ appeal. On September 27, 1982, the resolution dismissing the appeal has become final and executory.

On January 11, 1983, Sections 18 of the Interim Rules of Court was promulgated, implementing the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 29, providing that the filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with. This is Thus, on April 12, 1983, the respondents asked the appellate court to recall the records of the case from the court of origin.

Issue:
Can the law have retroactive effect on the case despite the court’s decision being final and executory?

Ruling:
No. To revive or recall a case whose decision has become final and executory would be an injustice to those whose favor the case has been decided. As provided in Alday v. Camilon, “Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.” When the judgment becomes final, the favored party is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the judgment.

Roy v. CA
G.R. No. 80718
January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
CO URT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

Facts:
The petitioners owned a firewall that had weakened and collapsed on the tailoring shop owned by the private respondents, causing injuries and death to Marissa Bernal, a daughter. The RTC ruled that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages to respondents. The petitioners appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. A copy of the decision of the CA was received by the petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, the petitioners asked the CA to extend the time to file a motion for reconsideration. According to a previous case, Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. The petitioners contend that the case of Habaluyas could not be made binding because it has not been published in the Official Gazette at the time the CA promulgated its decision.

Issue:
Is the ruling on an unpublished case binding?

Ruling:
Yes. There is no law requiring the publication of a Supreme Court decision for it to be binding and effective. The counsel of the petitioners should be responsible for keeping abreast with Supreme Court decisions as a lawyer.

Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Judge Zosimo Angeles
G.R. No. 108461
October 21, 1996

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI; REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC, INC., respondents.

Facts:
The Philippine Trading International Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 which commands that applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for at one is to one ratio.

The private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, applied for authority to import with the petitioner. However, they failed to comply with the mandates of AO SOCPEC 89-09-01 so that further import applications were withheld by PITC. Because of this, Remington filed for a petition for prohibition and madamus with prayer for the issuance of a TRO against PITC and was joined by Firestone later.

Hon. Zosimo Angeles, the judge handling the case at the trial court, granted the petitioners’ request and declared as null and void and unconstitutional the administrative order issued by the PITC. Among his reasons for the judgment was the fact that the AO was not published. Later on, President Fidel Ramos directed the Department of Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing the said AO.

The respondents contend that the case has been moot and moved for its early resolution. PITC, however, disagreed that the case is moot because the respondents still have an outstanding liability.

Issues:
1. Does the administrative order have a binding effect even if it had not been published?
2. Can the respondents be made liable for an unpublished administrative order?

Ruling:
1. No. As provided by Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws is an indispensable step in making the law effective. The administrative order in question should have been implemented because its purpose is to “enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.” Therefore, even before the president has directed that the AO cease to be implemented, it had never been legally effective.

2. No. The unpublished administrative order had no effect in pursuance to Article 2 of the Civil Code so any liability incurred because of it is invalid.

Tanada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus from the Court in order to compel the respondent public officials to publish in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive implementations, and administrative orders. They did so because of the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. In addition, petitioners stress that Article 2 of the Civil Code requires the publication of laws as a requirement for their effectivity.

Issue:
Can laws of general application take effect even without being published as long as it provides the date of effectivity?

Ruling:
No. “Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.” This is because if laws are allowed to take effect without publication, the public would not be informed of the existence of the law that essentially governs them. Without such publication, Article 3 of the Civil Code, which provides that “ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith” would have no basis. Thus, the Court ruled that all unpublished laws which are of general application have no binding force and effect.

NOTES
Another Issue
• There is another issue in this case, which is the legal standing of the petitioners. It has been ruled by the Court that since the matter involves a public right and therefore a concern for the public, the petitioners have the standing in this case.
Legislative Powers of the President
• The Court recognized in this case the importance of publication of laws since the president now has the power to make laws. They point out that while the public can be aware of the laws made by the legislative department through the broadcasting of debates and deliberations in the Batasang Pambansa, they do not have the same privilege with legislation made by the president.