It's a Ping Thing

Caballo v. People Case Digest (GR No. 198732)

Caballo v. People

GR No. 198732

June 10, 2013

Facts:

Christian Caballo, then 23 years old, met AAA, who was then 17 years old. AAA’s uncle was a choreographer, and Caballo was one of the dancers. AAA was a sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos, residing at a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu to attend the Sinulog festival and visited AAA. They eventually became sweethearts. When AAA went hoem to Surigao City in March 1998, Caballo persuaded her to have sexual intercourse with him. He had promised to marry her and assured her that she would not get pregnant because he would be using the withdrawal method. The sexual encounters happened several times more until AAA became pregnant and gave birth on March 8, 1999.

Caballo was charged for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. The RTC convicted him of the charge, while the appellate court affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification that it was Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 that was violated. Even though Section 10(a) was in the designation, it was Section 5(b) that the body supports.

Caballo contends that he should not be convicted because he did not coerce AAA to have sex with him as it was consensual.

Issue:

Whether Caballo coerced AAA to have sexual intercourse with him.

Ruling:

Yes. According to Section 5(b) of Article III of RA 7610,

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited inprostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: . . . HICcSA

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period . . .

RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy affording special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, amd discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The SC cited People v. Larin, which held that a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group.

Unlike rape, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The Court also cited its ruling in Malto that says “for purpose of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable.”

Borjal v. CA Case Digest ( GR No. 126466)

Borjal v. CA

GR No. 126466

January 14, 1999

Facts:

Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven was the publisher and chairman of its editorial board. Borjal was among the regular writers of The Philippien Star who runs the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles written in Jaywalker, which called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed hero.

Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was organized. Its objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated to cost around Php1,815,000, which would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors. Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to support the conference.

The Jaywalkercontained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the organizer nor the conference referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article, filed a case of libel against Borjal, Soliven, and others. The trial court as well as the appellate court found the accused guilty of libel.

Issue:

Were the courts a quo correct in convicting the accused of libel?

Ruling:

No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. In the case at bar, these requisites were not complied with.

Even Wenceslao admitted that he had doubts whether he was really the organizer referred to in the articles. In fact, he admitted that there were several organizers and that he spoke to Borjal to inquire if he was the one talked about in the articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when even the victim is unsure that he was the object of the attack.

The other errors revolve around the issue of whether the articles constitute privileged communications. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Article 354 of the RPC provides the cases of privileged communication, to wit:

Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and,

2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

The Supreme Court agrees that the articles are not within the exceptions of Article 354, but this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumeration under Article 354 is not exclusive. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The conference is one imbued with public interest, and Wenceslao is a public figure. The rule is that discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, but it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. Honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments.

Bonifacio v. RTC and Gimenez Case Digest (GR No. 184800)

Bonifacio v. RTC and Gimenez

GR No. 184800

May 5, 2010

Facts:

On August 25, 2005, officers, trustees, and members of the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) published defamatory articles and statements in their website http://www.pepcoalition.com. Their publication contained highly derogatory statements and allegedly false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family, the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.

On May 5, 2006, The Makati Prosecutor’s Office found probable cause to indict the accused and filed 13 separate informations, charging them with libel. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. They contended that the information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel. The Makati RTC granted the motion and quashed the information, but the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that even assuming that the information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment. This motion for reconsideration was granted by the RTC who then ordered the prosecution to amend the information to read

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website http://www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknownand all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City

Again, petitioners moved to quash the information which they alleged still failed to vest jurisdiction. Note that the prosecution laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessedthe internet-published article. The petitioner’s motion, however, was not granted by the RTC.

Issue:

Was there grave abuse of discretion by the RTC when it admitted the amended information?

Ruling:

Yes. As held in Macasaet, there are two places wherein libel cases may be tried: (1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the offense or (2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The amended information in the case at bar opted to lay the venue by availing the second option. The prosecution stated that the article was first published and accessedby the complainant in Makati City. In other words, it considered accessing to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

The Supreme Court then looked at the situation of libel cases before Article 360 of the RPC was amended by RA 4363. Before, the injured party has the choice of venue. However, experience showed that the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. Thus, RA 4363 laid down specific rules as to the venue to avoid this problem.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.

If the Court will hold that the amended information vested jurisdiction in the Courts of Makati simple because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the website was accessed or capable of being accessed.

Litonjua v. L & R Corporation Case Digest (GR No. 130722)

Litonjua v. L & R Corporation

GR No. 130722

December 9, 1999

Facts

The spouses Litonjua obtained a loan from L&R Corporation, which was secured by a mortgage of two parcels of land owned by the couple. In 1979, the spouses sold the parcels of land to Philippine White House Auto Supply Inc. (PWHAS), and the sale was annotated at the back of the certificates of title. When the spouses defaulted in the payment of their loans to L&R, the company initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure. The properties were successfully foreclosed and sold at a public auction, wherein L&R was the only bidder.

L&R was about to register the sale, but it learned for the first time of the Litonjuas’ sale of the lands to PWHAS.

The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage between the spouses and L&R contained the following provisions:

Section 8: That the mortgagors shall not sell, dispose of, mortgage, nor in any other manner encumber the real property/properties subject of this mortgage without the prior written consent of the mortgagee;

Section 9: That should the mortgagors decide to sell the real property/properties subject of this mortgage, the mortgagee shall be duly notified thereof by the mortgagors and should the mortgagee be interested to purchase the same, the latter shall be given priority over all the other prospective buyers

Issues

1. Are paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Real Estate Mortgage valid and enforceable?

2. Is the sale of the properties to PWHAS without the consent of L&R valid?

Ruling

1. Paragraph 8 is invalid but paragraph 9 is valid.

Par. 8 violates Article 2130 of the Civil Code which provides that stipulation forbidding the owner from alienating the immovable shall be void. While it is true that the provisions does not absolutely prohibit the mortgagor from selling his property, what it does not outrightly prohibit, it nevertheless achieves. For all intents and purposes, the stipulation practically gives the mortgagee the sole prerogative to prevent any sale of the mortgaged property to a third party. Being contrary to law, the provision is void and is not binding on the parties.

Par. 9, on the other hand, is perfectly valid. The right to first refusal has long been recognized as valid in Philippine jurisdiction.

2. The sale is valid but RESCISSIBLE. The Court cited the case of Guzman, Bocaling & Co v. Bonnevie, where it held that a contract of sale which violated the right of first refusal was rescissible.

It is clear from the facts that the spouses did not inform L&R of their intent to sell the properties. By doing so, they disrespected the latter’s right to first refusal. Furthermore, although the right was not exercised by the company at the opportune time, this cannot be taken against it because they were never informed of the sale in the first place.

Ada v. Baylon Case Digest (GR No. 182435)

Ada v. Baylon

GR No. 182435

August 13, 2012

Facts

Florentino and Maximina Baylon died in 1961 and 1974, respectively. They were survived by their children Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon, and Lilia. Victoria died in 1981, survived by a daughter, Luz Adanza, one of the petitioners. Ramon, on the other hand, was survived by respondent Florante Baylon when he died in 1989.

The petitioners allege that Florentino and Maximina Baylon owned 43 parcels of land in their lifetime and that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land, appropriating for herself the income from the same. They further allege that Rita used the income to buy two parcels of land. Because of this, the petitioners wanted to include those two parcels of land in the partition by filing a civil case.

During the pendency of the case, Rita executed a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, in favor of her nephew Florante Baylon. The petitioners now seek to rescind the Deed of Donation.

Issue

Should rescission be granted?

Ruling

Yes. Pursuant to Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code, contracts which “refer to things under litigation, if they have been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority, are rescissible.” The rescission of such a contract requires the concurrence of the following:

1. The defendant, during the pendency of the case, enters into a contract which refers to the thing subject of litigation

2. The said contract was entered into without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of a competent judicial authority

The purpose of Article 1381 (4) is to secure the possible effectivity of the impending judgment by a court with respect to the thing subject of litigation. The rescission not preconditioned upon the judicial determination as to the ownership of the thing subject of litigation. Rita’s failure to inform and seek the approval of the petitioners or the RTC regarding the conveyance gave the petitioners the right to rescind the said donation.

Bobis v. The Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte Case Digest (GR No. L-29838)

Bobis v. The Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte and Zosimo Rivera

GR No. L-29838

March 18, 1983

Facts

Rufina Camino and Pastor Eco were the registered owners of a parcel of land. The said land was cultivated by spouses Fermin Bobis and Emilia Guadalupe. On July 25, 1950, Alfonso Ortega filed a complaint against the four for the recovery of possession of one-half of the cleared and planted portion of the land, or the payment of Php1,650, which is the value of the improvements he introduced thereon. The parties, on August 16, 1950, executed a compromise agreement, which states that Camino and Eco shall pay Ortega Php140 as payment for the improvements and that after such payment is made, Ortega would respect the absolute and exclusive ownership of the land.

On August 26, 1950, just ten days after the execution of the compromise agreement, Eco and Camino sold the land to Bobis and Guadalupe. Later, on January 22, 1951, the compromise agreement was approved by the court. When the obligation became due on February 28, 1951, Eco and Camino paid Ortega only Php50 instead of the agreed upon Php140. As a result, a writ of execution was issued, commanding the sheriff to levy the good and chattels of the four defendants. Consequently, the sheriff levied on the land sold to Bobis and Guadalupe. The land was later on sold to Zosimo Rivera at an execution sale.

Issue

1. Was the writ of execution valid?

2. Was the sale of the land to Bobis and Guadalupe done to defraud Ortega?

Ruling

1. No. The writ of execution was null and void with respect to Bobis and Guadalupe. Thus, the subsequent sale to Rivera was also void. It can be seen in the compromise agreement that only Eco and Camino were obliged to pay Php140 to Ortega even though Bobis and Guadalupe were made a party to the case. The court acted in excess of jurisdiction. The judgement in the civil case was based upon a compromise agreement of the parties. In Yboleon v. Sison, the Court ruled that “a judge or court, which sets aside a judgment rendered upon consent of the parties and based on a compromise entered into by them, which is converted into such judgment, cannot amend or set it aside without the consent of said parties, or without first having declared in an incidental preliminary hearing that such compromise is vitiated by any of the ground for nullity enumerated in Art 2038 of the Civil Code.”

2. No. The rule is that fraud is not presumed. Being criminal in nature, fraud should be proved by clear preponderance of evidence. In order that the contract may be rescinded by reason of fraud to creditors, the following must concur:

a. It should be shown that both contracting parties have acted maliciously and with fraud and for the purpose of prejudicing said creditors

b. The creditors must be deprived by the transaction of all means by which they may effect collection of their claims.

All these circumstances must be present.

There is no evidence that Camino and Eco connived with Bobis and Guadalupe to defraud Ortega. There is also no evidence that the sale tended to deprive Ortega of means to collect his claim from the obligors. Even if the circumstances can be considered as badges of fraud, the sale cannot be considered in fraud of creditors in absence of proof that Camino and Eco have no other properties except that parcel of land sold to Bobis and Guadalupe.

Dilag v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case Digest (GR No. 72727)

Dilag v. Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. 72727

July 30, 1987

Facts

Herminio Arellano died in a vehicular accident on July 1, 1968 involving a truck owned by spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag. His father, Marciano Arellano, was awarded by the trial court money damages, and the decision became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued on February 16, 1979.

The Dilag spouses and Arellano came into a compromise agreement but the same was disapproved by the court for failure of the Dilags to sign it. Pursuant to the writ of execution, a notice of Levy on Execution was annotated on a parcel of land owned by the Dilags. An examination of the title shows that there is an adverse claim inscribed therein, dated March 11, 1974 filed by the Dilag spouses’ children. The children had a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on November 21, 1973. The adverse claim also stated that the owner’s duplicate certificate was then in the possession of the Development Bank of the Philippines, to which the property had been mortgaged. The title further shows an inscription on July 25, 1979 of a Contract of Lease executed on February 9, 1979. The lease was in favor of David and Erlinda Diancin.

But pursuant to the writ of execution, the provincial sheriff sold at a public auction to Marciano Arellano the parcel of land. This was on August 26, 1981. The next day, a corresponding Certificate of Sale was inscribed to the title, subject to the right of redemption. However, on the same date of the sale (August 26, 1981), another inscription appears bearing a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the Dilag spouses in favor of their children. The land was supposedly sold for Php30,000.

A year after the Certificate of Sale was inscribed in favor or Arellano, the Dilag spouses failed to exercise their right of redemption. Thus, a Definite Deed of Sale was executed. According to the Sheriff’s Return of Service, the delivery was made to Arellano, who executed a Delivery Receipt. Later on, Arellano sold the parcel of land to Marcelino Florete Jr. and Leon Coo for Php150,000.

David Diancin, the lessee, executed a deed giving up his claim or interest as a lessee over the land in favor of Arellano in consideration of Php38,000 as payment for his fish fry in the fish pond in the property. Because of this, Sussie Dilag, one of the Dilag children, executed a Notarial Rescission of the Lease Contract effective July 2, 1983.

Issue

Was the sale of the land in 1973 by the Dilag spouses in favor of their children valid?

Ruling

No. Clearly, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Dilag children executed in 1973 was a simulated and fictitious transaction to defraud Arellano who obtained a money judgment against the Dilag spouses. First of all, the consideration was insufficient. Second, the Dilag spouses continued exercising acts of ownership over the land as evidenced by the fact that they leased it to Diancin in 1979. Third, the Dilag children relied on the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1981 instead of the one in 1974 when they secured the cancellation of the title. Fourth, even assuming that the children became the valid owners of the land by virtue of the 1981 Deed of Absolute Sale, they failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period provided by law.

Del Rosario v. Bengzon Case Digest

Del Rosario v. Bengzon

GR No. 88265

December 21, 1989

Facts:

The Philippine Medical Association questioned the validity of some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (RA 6675) and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62. The law provides that all government health agencies and their personnel as well as other government agencies shall use generic names in all transactions. All medical, dental, and veterinary practitioners are likewise ordered to write prescriptions using the generic name. The brand name may also be written, but the generic name should be legible and should precede the brand name. It is also prohibited to put the generic name in parenthesis and to order the drug seller not to allow substitution for the prescription. Furthermore, the law also provides that drug outlets shall inform the buyer about any and all other products having the same generic name. The Association contends that such act tantamount to the salesgirl at the drugstore counter making the prescription instead of the physician, dentist, or veterinarian.

Issues:

1. Is the Generics Act valid?

2. Does the law impair the obligation of contract between the physician and patient?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The purpose of the Generics Act is to carry out the policy of the State. It was found that the therapeutic effect of a drug does not depend on its brand but on the active ingredients which it contains. The law compels physicians to prescribe drugs based on their active ingredients instead of their brand names. In addition, the prohibition of disallowing substitution is also valid because it prevents the circumvention of the law.

2. No. In the first place, no contract ever results from a consultation between physician and patient. The patient has no obligation to follow the physician’s prescription as he can disregard the same. Even assuming arguendo that there is a contract between them, such contract will not be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community.

Lozano v. Martinez Case Digest

Lozano v. Martinez

GR No. L-63419

December 18, 1986

Facts:

A report stated that per day, the approximate value of bouncing checks was close to Php200 million. Thus, the Bouncing Checks Law, BP 22, was enacted to put a stop or to curb the practice of issuing checks that are worthless. It addresses the problem directly by making the act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

The petitioners in this case challenges the constitutionality of the said law on the following grounds: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt, (2) it impairs freedom of contract, (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause, (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers, and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage, the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.

Issue:

Is BP 22 constitutional?

Ruling:

Yes. It is true that the Constitution guarantees protection from imprisonment by reason of nonpayment of debt or poll taxes, but as stated in Ganaway v. Quillen, the debt intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty refers to those arising from contracts and not for those ex delicto. BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power since the law punished the act not as an offense against property but as an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 was a declaration by the legislature that the making and issuance of worthless checks is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. In this regard, the Court cannot question the wisdom of the statute.

There is also no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs the freedom of contract. This is because what the Constitution protects is the freedom to enter into lawful contracts, i.e., those that do not contravene public policy.

As to the denial of the equal protection of laws, it is held that BP 22 did not do so since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It was contended by the petitioners that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer because if the former did not present it to the bank, the crime would not have been completed. This fact was also thought to constitute undue delegation of legislative powers. But the absurdity of this contention is obvious. Legislative power means the power to make laws. It cannot be said that the power to make the law or define the crime was delegated to the payee just because the consummation of the crime will depend upon his presentation of the worthless check to the bank.

Finally, as to the amendment of the bill on the third reading that would eventually become BP 22, it was found that indeed, there was some confusion among the members of the Batasan on what the exact text was because the amendments were proposed orally. However, it is clear from the records that it was actually the text approved by the body on Second Reading. In fact, before the bill was submitted for final approval on the final reading, the Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter.

Thus, BP 22 is constitutional and valid.

Balacuit v. CFI Agusan del Norte Case Digest

Balacuit v. CFI Agusan del Norte

GR No. L-38429

June 30, 1988

Facts:

On April 21, 1969, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640, which penalizes persons and entities engaged in the business of selling admission tickets for movies or other public events who require children between the ages of 7 and 12 to pay full price. Petitioners are managers of theaters of the said city. They contended that the ordinance was unconstitutional and should not be enforced. The Municipal Board, on the other hand, insisted that it as a valid exercise of police power because as provided in RA 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, the Board has the power to regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for theaters, cinematographs, etc.

Issue:

Is the act of the Municipal Board a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling:

No. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinance was created to help parents who complain that paying full price for their children is too financially burdensome. This is not a public necessity. A police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare. There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.