It's a Ping Thing

A Review of Bird Box: Book vs. Movie

*****SPOILERS AHEAD*****

Source: indiewire.com

Josh Malerman’s horror novel made its name in the BookTube community a few years ago, and I’ve seen a lot of people recommending it, saying it’s one of the scariest books they’ve ever read. I’ve been intending to pick it up, but it wasn’t until the film adaptation was released that I finally got around to it. I’m a fan of Sandra Bullock’s work, so I immediately read the book after watching the trailer. Bird Box as a book did not disappoint. But as a movie, it did.

I’m not saying that the movie is bad because as evidenced by its many fans all over the world, it’s easily one of the most popular movies today. It’s just that I have the prejudice of one who knows the original story and expecting most of the scenes to be faithfully translated on-screen. Movies seldom successfully convey the messages and feelings that a book is able to. In books, you get to know the characters better, even the minor ones. There are also minor scenes in a book that may not be as significant as others but set the tone for the main story. There are understandable omissions and alterations that writers do in film adaptations to make the movie better. However, I honestly think that the writers of Bird Box made a lot of wrong calls.

What caught my attention first was Malorie’s sister’s name. For some reason, they changed it from Shannon to Jessica. Perhaps because Jessica is a stronger name which would highlight her strength and emphasize that committing suicide was very unlikely for her to do. I hadn’t recovered from that name change yet when the apocalyptic scene outside the hospital was shown. People were becoming crazy all at once and boom! Without warning, Shannon/Jessica dies after seeing the “creatures.” Immediately after losing her sister, Malorie was rescued by a woman who tells her to go into the safe house, where she meets the other major characters. Those scenes were just too fast-paced. The book spends more time discussing about Malorie’s doubt about the reported creatures. She insists on disbelief until the day her sister killed herself in the bathroom (not ran over by a truck as in the movie). After discovering her sister’s death, Malorie drives to the safe house which she saw in an ad. For most of the trip, her eyes were closed. She was supposed to seek the house, unsure of its existence, and unsure of whether the people there were still alive. She was not dragged from the streets by a woman who tells her to get inside. That was way too easy. This change robs the viewers of the chance to witness Malorie’s agony of driving blindly to a location while she was pregnant, uncertain of what awaited her, and bumping into unknown objects on the streets.

The manner of entering the house was also changed. They were supposed to have a system. Some people would grab broomsticks, instructing the newcomer to enter immediately. They would put their blindfolds on or close their eyes as they sweep the areas near the door to make sure no creature got in when the door was opened. It was a more thorough routine than closing their eyes and hoping for the best.

One of the major changes that I found both funny and annoying at the same time was the change in race and age of the characters already inside the house when Malorie arrived. It was as if the writers were trying to fit as much diversity into that single scene as possible. The elderly was represented. There was an Asian guy. There were both Black and Caucasian people. There’s a heavily tattooed young person. And when she appears, Olympia was played by a plus-size actress. A lot of these characters are not even in the book. Don’t get me wrong. I’m not against the diversity. In fact, I love diversity in movies, but these changes scream of the writers’ desperation of representing as many groups as possible. Maybe they could have done it in a subtler way. They didn’t have to add more characters into the story that didn’t do much to help the plot move forward just for the sake of representation.

So how should the characters have looked like? There were supposed to be just four guys and one girl when Malorie enters the house, and they’re all relatively young. In fact, when they admitted Gary into the house, he commented on their youth. Tom was described as one with blue eyes, blondish brown hair, and freckles. Jules is tall with short dark hair. Don also has dark hair and was around 27 years old. Felix was perhaps the youngest, being 21 or 22, tall and thin, with a long nose and bushy brown hair. The only other woman upon Malorie’s arrival−Cheryl−was merely described as having brown hair. George, the owner of the house, was long dead when Malorie came. His name was also changed to Greg in the movie.

Sadly, the changes in the characters did not stop with the physical and numerical alterations. The most disappointing change was the relationship between Tom and Malorie. While it is true that Malorie was more reliant on Tom than everybody else in the house, it was not because of romantic reasons. It was because among all of them, Tom was the wisest, always looking for ways to better their way of living. He had also lost a beloved daughter, a fact which made Malorie closer to him because she was pregnant and felt that Tom would be able to sympathize with her more.

I was also not a fan of Malorie’s rapid development in the movie. Even though I love a strong female character, she became too strong too soon in the film adaptation. We didn’t get to see much of her vulnerabilities and her difficulty of adjusting to her new way of life. This is largely because she didn’t have much adjusting to do in the new house in the movie because they had almost everything they needed except for additional food. In the book, they had no water to drink or to clean with. They had to take turns fetching water from a nearby well and emptying buckets of feces and urine.

The movie also showed Malorie capable of doing house raids for food even when she was alone, maneuvering around the neighborhood quite easily. In the book, it was much harder for them to get around, taking the search volunteers days or weeks before they could get back. When they enter the house, they would often find the rotting dead bodies of the owners, making the task harder.

The one change I was quite happy with in the film adaptation was the fact that those already insane are immune to the creatures. In the book, this idea was considered by the characters but the only confirmation−if you could call it that−was in the person of Gary. They also discovered that the creatures had the same effect in animals. This mental sickness as immunity made Gary scary in a different way, especially because of the other insane people who had no problem surviving. In the book, Gary brings a briefcase with him, which piqued Malorie’s interest. She secretly took it from him while the latter was asleep, and finds a notebook inside. She discovered that it was filled with ideas that show the writer was convinced the creatures were harmless. When Malorie tells the others about her discovery, they voted to evict Gary from the house despite his declaration that the notebook was not his. Don voted against the eviction, but he was outnumbered. They closed their eyes and opened the door to let Gary out.

Unbeknownst to them, Don hid Gary in the cellar while the rest of the members had their eyes closed. As Malorie and Olympia were giving birth in the same room, they heard a noise downstairs. It was coming from the birds in the bird box that they used as an alarm, signaling that someone (or something) was at their door. Later on, Don (not Gary) strips down the covers and opens the door to let the creature in. Malorie and Olympia were left in the room, having already delivered their babies. All other members were dying downstairs, and finally, it was time for the creature to come to them. Gary reveals himself, cursing at Malorie for evicting him. The creature then enters the room. Yes, it actually enters as opposed to making a mere special appearance through the window as in the movie. Olympia sees it and talks to it. After she went crazy, she climbed out the window and was hanged by the cord that once connected her baby to her. Don’t ask me how that’s possible or how it should look like. I’m also confused.

In the movie, Gary was killed by Tom, who then rescued Malorie and the children. Imagine how much scarier Malorie’s situation is in the book. She’s left alone in the room with two newborn babies with a traitor in one corner and the creature on the other. Her friend hangs dead by the window and the others butchered one another downstairs. There was no Tom to rescue her. She had to do everything alone.

Now let’s discuss the titular bird box. In the movie, Malorie finds birds in an abandoned grocery store while on a supply run. They were in a cage, and Malorie kept them inside the house. I was interested in this change because the bird box, which is this

Source: vinehousefarm.co.uk

was supposed to be their form of alarm to inform them that someone was at their door. It was Tom’s idea. The birds made noise when Gary arrived. They also made noise when the creature entered. In the movie, when they had to cross the river, Malorie takes the birds and put them in a box. There, I thought. They literally had the birds in a box. This will be the only “bird box” viewers will see. I was not a fan of this change, but I do find it quite funny.

Overall, I found the movie disappointing solely because I read the book first. I was looking out for scenes that did not make it in the screenplay and was let down by the changes. However, I do acknowledge that if I had watched the movie without having read the book first, I might have enjoyed it immensely. The actors did a good job, and the concept was novel. As always, Sandra delivered a wonderful performance. The children were also really good actors. John Malkovich (Douglas) knows how to make you hate his character so much. As for the plot, I loved the addition of the marauders because it gives our main characters additional problems. They had to deal not only with the creatures but with cold-blooded humans as well.

Although I did not like the movie as much as most people did, I’m still happy for its existence because it was what made me pick the book up in the first place. Without the hype, I may never have read it.

If you’ve enjoyed the movie, perhaps you should consider reading the book next. I know I had spoiled a lot of the scenes here, but trust me; there are others that would surprise you still.

Magbanua v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case Digest

Magbanua v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72

June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA, SR., PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners,

vs.

HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION), EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed PEREZ, respondents

Facts:

The plaintiffs, who are the petitioners in the case at bar, are share tenants of the defendants. The defendants diverted free flow of water from their farms, which caused portions of their land to dry up. The plaintiffs were told by the defendant’s overseer that they should vacate their areas because they could no longer plant palay because of the lack of water. The petitioners went to the trial court to pray that they be declared as leasehold tenants and for defendants to be ordered to pay for damages and attorney’s fees.

The trial court granted their prayers including granting moral and exemplary damages of Php10,000 each and attorney’s fees of Php5,000. When the defendant appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, however, the IAC modified the trial court’s decision, deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Should the petitioners be granted moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

Ruling:

Yes. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code and the latter stipulates that: “Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants acted in an oppressive manner.

However, the Supreme Court said that the amount would be according to the court’s discretion. The petitioners were granted the payment for damages and attorney’s fees, but they were set to te following: Moral Damages – Php1,000; Exemplary Damages: Php500; Attorney’s fees – Php1,000.

Allied Banking Corporation v. Lim Sio Wan Case Digest

Allied Banking Corporation v. Lim Sio Wan

G.R. No. 133179

March 27, 2008

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner

versus

LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., Respondents

Facts:

On November 14, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited a money market placement worth Php1,152,597.35 to Allied Bank for a term of 31 days to mature on December 15, 1983. On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of Allied Bank, and instructed her to preterminate the money market placement and to issue a manager’s check representing the proceeds from the placement and to give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos, who would pick up the check.

Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a manager’s check to be issued. The check was cross-checked for Payees Account Only and given to Santos. Then the check was deposited to the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at Metrobank, with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan.

Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had deposited a money market placement forPhp2 million to Producers Bank. Santos was the money market trader assigned to handle FCC’s account. The placement matured on October 25, 1983, and was rolled over until December 5, 1983. The Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Bank’s payment of its obligation to FCC.

Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check in compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations. The guaranty read: All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed. The check was then sent to Allied Bank through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded it even without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement. So the amount of the check was credited to the account of FCC.

On December 14, 1983, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied Bank to withdraw the money market placement. When she was informed that the placement has been terminated upon her instructions, she took action. She filed a complaint with the RTC against Allied to recover the proceeds of the money market placement.

Allied filed a third party complaint against Metrobank and Santos. In turn, Metrobank filed a fourth party complaint against FCC. Then FCC filed a fifth party complaint against Producers Bank.

Six months after the funding of the check, Allied informed Metrobank that the signature in the check was forged. Thus, Metrobank withheld the amount but later on agreed to release it to FCC after the latter executed an undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse the amount.

Lim Sio Wan then filed an amended complaint, adding Metrobank as party-defendant along with Allied. The RTC rendered the following decision:

1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid;

2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;

3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P173,792.20 by way of attorney’s fees; and,

4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit.

Defendant Allied Banks cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is DISMISSED.

Likewise defendant Metrobanks third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is

DISMISSED.

Filipinas Cement Corporations fourth-party complaint against Producers Bank is also

DISMISSED.

Upon appeal, the CA promulgated the following decision:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Allied alleged that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank.

Issue:

Was Allied Bank correct in saying that Producers Bank was unjustly enriched?

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when the following concur:

1. A person is unjustly benefited

2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another

In the instant case, Lim Sio Wans money market placement in Allied Bank was preterminated and withdrawn without her consent. Moreover, the proceeds of the placement were deposited in Producers Banks account in Metrobank without any justification. It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be considered as having been unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that FCCs money market placement with Producers Bank was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Banks payment thereof was justified.

Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the CA’s ruling be upheld with modification. Producers Bank was ordered to pay Allied and Metrobank the amounts.

University of the East v. Jader Case Digest

University of the East v. Jader

G.R. No. 132344

February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.

ROMEO A. JADER, respondent

Facts:

Romeo Jader was a law student at the University of the East from 1984 to 1988. In his first semester of his fourth year, he failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester and on February 1, 1988, he filed an examination for the removal of his incomplete grade, which was approved by the dean. He took the examination but was given a grade of 5 (failing).

The dean and the faculty members of the university deliberated as to who among their graduating students would be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name was in the tentative list of candidates for graduation. The invitation for the commencement exercises also included his name, but at the foot of the list, the following was written:

This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports

During the ceremony, Jader’s name was called, and he received a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the law diploma. After graduation, he took a leave of absence without pay from his job to prepare for the bar examination and enrolled in a pre-bar review class. When he learned the deficiency in his requirements for graduation, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar exam.

Jader filed a case in the trial court, and the latter granted him the amount of Php35,470 as well as Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. At the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was upheld, but the CA added the award for moral damages amounting to Php50,000.

Issues:

1. Can the University of the East be held liable for actual damages?

2. Is the university liable to pay Jader moral damages?

Ruling:

1. Yes. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. The university could not just give the grades at any time because law students have a deadline to meet in the submission of requirements for taking the bar. It was guilty of negligence and for violating Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, which provide

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

2. No. The Supreme Court did not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Jader suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate. It was his duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination.

The Court affirmed the CA’s decision with modification. It granted Jader the actual damages of Php35,470 with legal interest of 6 percent per annum computed from the date of the complaint until fully paid, as well as Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. The award for moral damages, however, was deleted.

Bugayong v. Ginez Case Digest

Bugayong v. Ginez

G.R. No. L-10033

December 28, 1956

Facts:

Benjamin Bugayong is married to Leonila Ginez. Since Benjamin is a serviceman at the US Navy, they agreed that Leonila would stay with her husband’s sisters. However, in 1951, Leonila informed her husband that she would be living with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.

As early as July 1951, Banjamin received letters from his sister-in-law and from anonymous writers that his wife committed acts of infidelity. In a letter, Leonila admitted that a certain “Eliong” had kissed her. In August 1952, Banjamin went back to Pangasinan to look for his wife. After finding her in her godmother’s house, she convinced her to stay with him in his cousin’s house. They lived there for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they went to Benajmin’s house and again lived there for a night as husband and wife. During the hearing, Bejamin admitted that they slept together during those times. However, when he proceeded to confront his wife about her alleged infidelity, the latter merely packed up and left.

On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation which the trial court dismissed for the sole reason of condonation on the part of the husband.

Issue:

Does the fact that the husband slept with his wife after knowing of her alleged act of infidelity amount to condonation?

Ruling:

Yes. The controlling law of the case is the Civil Code, particularly Articles 97, 100, and 102 thereof, which provide

Article 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed

(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code

Article 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

Article 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. The Supreme Court decided that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish that Leonila committed adultery. But even assuming arguendo that she did, the act of Banjamin’s sleeping with her amounts to condonation.

The court cited US cases wherein a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation.

The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Partosa-Jo v. CA Case Digest

Partosa-Jo v. CA

G.R. No. 82606

December 18, 1992

Facts:

Jose Jo is a Chinese national, and Prima Partosa is his legal wife. Jose Jo admitted that he had cohabited with three other women and fathered 15 children. The two agreed that Prima would temporarily leave their conjugal home in Dumaguete City to stay with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. In 1942, Prima went back to Dumaguete, but she was not accepted by her husband.

In 1980, Prima filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as well as for support. The trial court judge rendered the decision granting Prima a monthly support of Php500, Php40,000 for the construction of a house where she may live separately, Php19,200 by way of support in-arrears, and Php3,000 for attorney’s fees. However, the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause for action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.

Jose contended that the decision of the trial court could no longer be reviewed by the Court of Appeals because it has long since become final and executory. Prima, on the other hand, argued that a disposition of that case was made in the penultimate paragraph of the decision. It reads:

“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.”

Prima believed this to be the dispositive portion of the case.

Issues:

1. Can the appellate court still rule on the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision?

2. Is Prima Partosa-Jo entitled to a judicial separation of conjugal property?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the drafting of the decision was not exactly careful. Although the petitioner’s counsel should have taken immediate steps in rectifying the ruling, a mere technical defect is not insuperable. It has been ruled that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final.

2. Yes. The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, invoked Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads

Article 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership except that

****

(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property.

Article 178 of the Civil Code had been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code at the time of the decision by the Supreme Court. As was ruled in Ramirez v. CA, “an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment.”

Article 128 of the Family Code reads:

If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.

As early as 1942, Jose had already rejected his wife and refused to give financial support to her. This falls squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, which provides that if at the time of the petition, the spouses had been separated for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable, it should be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property.

Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo’s petition for judicial separation of property is granted.

People v. Sensano and Ramos Case Digest

People v. Sensano and Ramos

G.R. No. 37720

March 7, 1933

Facts:

Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married in 1919. Shortly after the birth of their child, Mariano went to the Province of Cagayan and remained there for three years. During his three-year stay, he did not write to his wife nor did he give support to her and the child. Ursula was poor and illiterate and had no relatives upon whom she could call. Then Marcelo Ramos took her and the child to live with him.

When Mariano returned in 1924, he filed a case against Ursula and Marcelo for adultery. They were sentenced to four months and 1 day. After completing the service of the sentence, Ursula asked for forgiveness from Mariano, to which the latter replied that she can do whatever she wants and that he wants nothing to do with her. Mariano then left for Hawaii where he stayed for seven years.

He knew that his wife had lived again with Marcelo. Upon his return to the Philippines, he again filed a case for adultery. The court of first instance sentenced Ursula and Marcelo to 3 years, 6 months, and 21 days in prison. They contended that the court of first instance erred in not considering that Mariano had already consented to the adultery.

The Solicitor General contended that Mariano’s absence from the Philippines made it impossible for him to take any action.

Issue:

Had Mariano consented to his wife’s adulterous acts?

Ruling:

Yes. The fact that he told his wife that he had nothing to do with her and that she can do whatever she wants is considered as consent for the adultery. He did not interfere with his wife’s relations for seven years despite knowing that the latter was staying again with her lover.

The Solicitor General’s contention has no merit. He could still have taken actions despite his absence from the country had he wanted to.

Arroyo, Jr. v. CA Case Digest

Arroyo, Jr. v. CA

G.R. No. 96602

G.R. No. 96715

November 19, 1991

Facts:

Dr. Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo for adultery. In November 1982, Ruby went to Baguio with Mrs. Sare and witness Jabunan. They stayed at the Neri spouses’ Mines View Park Condominium. Arroyo arrived at 7:00 p.m. at the condominium. Jabunan said he opened the door for Arroyo and knocked on Ruby Neri’s door. Ruby then asked Mrs. Sare, who was in the room with her, to leave her and Arroyo alone. The two were left alone in the room and went out 45 minutes later. In December 1982, Dr. Neri then found incriminating pictures of his wife and Arroyo in bed. When questioned by her husband, Ruby admitted that she and Arroyo slept together in Baguio.

On August 26, 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, praying that the case against his wife and Arroyo be dismissed because he had tacitly consented to his wife’s infidelity. Ruby moved for reconsideration, contending that pardon had been extended by her husband and that Dr. Jorge Neri had married another woman with whom he is cohabiting. Both Arroyo and Ruby Neri filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal of their cases based on Dr. Neri’s manifestation.

Arroyo and Ruby used Dr. Neri’s affidavit to cast doubts on the doctor’s credibility as witness.

Issues:

1. Is Dr. Neri’s affidavit of desistance sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his credibility?

2. Had Mrs. Neri’s constitutional right against self-incrimination been violated?

3. Does Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair preclude him from filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto?

4. Is Dr. Neri’s manifestation a sufficient basis for granting a new trial?

Ruling:

1. No. It has been the Court’s constant holding that in certiorari proceedings, the findings of fact of the lower court as well as its conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed.

2. No. As held in Gamboa v. Cruz, “the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused.” Because Dr. Neri is not an investigating officer, Mrs. Neri’s confession to her husband could not be rejected by the court. As held in Aballe v. People,

“The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it.”

3. No. The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code but only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the said article relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involved any illegal contract.

4. No. Dr. Neri’s manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of testimony given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all recantations by witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial.

Pacete v. Carriaga Case Digest

Pacete v. Carriaga

G.R. No. 53880

March 17, 1994

Facts:

Enrico Pacete and Concepcion Alanis were married in 1938. Pacete contracted another marriage to Clarita de la Concepcion, which Alanis knew about only on August 1, 1979. During the marriage, Pacete acquired properties that he registered either under his name or Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita or with other dummies. Thus, on October 29, 1979, Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Pacete and de la Concepcion as well as for legal separation between her and her husband.

The defendants were served with summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for extension of 20 days, which the court granted. On December 18, 1979, the defendants again filed a motion for extension through a new counsel. The court granted the motion, setting the deadline to January 9, 1980. Although the court’s order was mailed to the defendants’ counsel on January 11, 1980, they again filed a motion for extension on February 5, 1980. The next day, the court denied the motion for extension and granted petitioner Alanis’ motion to declare the defendants in default.

The Court of First Instance, in its decision on March 17, 1980, decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis as well as declared null and void ab initio the marriage between Pacete and de la Concepcion.

Issue:

Did the Court of First Instance commit grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling:

Yes. A petition for certiorari is applicable when grave abuse of discretion attended the declaration of the decision. Article 101 of the Civil Code, which was later reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code, provides

No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated

The court did not follow the procedure mandated by the said procedure. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, mandates that an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before 6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition to allow the parties to have a cooling-off period.

In addition, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides

If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The State is interested in the integrity of marriage as evidenced by the provisions of law mentioned. There is no excuse for non-compliance with the procedures required by statute.

Sabalones v. Court of Appeals Case Digest

Sabalones v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 106169

February 14, 1994

Facts:

Samson Sabalones was married to Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, who managed the couple’s properties while the former was away at work. In 1981, Samson contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Cumareng. In 1985, upon his retirement, Samson came back to the Philippines and stayed with Cumareng. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership with Remedios. He claimed that he was 68 years old and sick and needed the proceeds of the sale for his hospitalization and medical treatment.

Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the property her husband was trying to sell was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for support on the rentals from another conjugal property. The court decreed the legal separation and declared the forfeiture of Samson’s share in the conjugal properties. The court further ordered that he was not entitled to support by his wife.

While the decision was on appeal, Remedios filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties. She further stated that her husband threatened their tenant that the contract would not be renewed. The writ was granted by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Was the Court of Appeals correct in granting the writ of preliminary injunction?

Ruling:

Yes. Article 61 of the Family Code states that after a petition for legal separation, the trial court shall appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to be the administrator of the conjugal properties if there was no written agreement between the spouses. Although there was no formal declaration by the trial court, it was implicitly provided in the decision that the administration would go to the wife since the court denied the husband any share in the conjugal properties.

The primary purpose of the injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or relations between the parties. The requirements for injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation, which was both present in the case.