It's a Ping Thing

Matthews v. Taylor

Spouses Buado v. Court of Appeals

US v. Pons 
34 Phil 729

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with illegal importation of opium. On the 5th or 6th of April 1915, the Spanish steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain bringing 25 barrels which were manifested as wine and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been engaged in the business as a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in Manila. The shipper’s invoice and bill of lading for the 25 barrels were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. Cansipit conducted negotiations and 25 barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Thereafter, the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as wine were consigned to persons whose names were not listed as merchants and having some doubt as to the nature of merchandise, instituted an investigation and traced on April 10, 1915 the 25 barrels to Beliso’s warehouse. It was found that the 25 barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso’s warehouse about 11AM of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso’s warehouse and the 2 had a conversation. Pons then left and thereafter several of the barrels arrived in Beliso’s bodega. Beliso then carefully selected 5 barrels out of the shipment and told his employee Sese to deliver them to Juan Pons at 144 Calle General Solano. The barrels were delivered to Pons. Pursuing their investigation, the customs secret service agents entered Beliso’s bodega on the 10th before the office was opened and awaited for Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and arrested. The agents only found 20 barrels in Beliso’s premises. The agents, upon being informed by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and found the missing 5 barrels, which were empty. The customs agents noticed several baskets of lime scattered about the basement and found 77 tins of opium in one of the baskets. It was found upon investigation that the owner of the house was Mariano Limjap, and that it was rented by one F.C. Garcia. The lease of the house was signed “F.C. Garcia, by Juan Pons”. They returned to the house of Beliso and selected three barrels and ordered them returned to the customhouse. Pons arrived at Beliso’s house and was placed under arrest. Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel contained opium. Pons further stated that he had delvered some 250 tins of opium to a Chinaman at 7:30am in the morning of April 10, following the instructions of Beliso. Pons also admitted that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions. At first Pons stated that F.C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in and between the provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, but later retracted and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. However, during the trial, Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia wrote him a letter directing him to rent a house. Pons said he destroyed the letter because he feared that it would compromise him.

The information reads: “…import and introduce 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400…did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt, and concealment of the same.”

On motion of counsel, Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, respondent to be confined in Bilibid for a period of 2 years and pay a fine of p1,000, and suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and payment of ½ the costs. The same penalties for Gbino, except his fine was P3,000.
In his motion, counsel for respondent alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of Februaryl that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of 1914; and that therefore the same is null and void.

It is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General’s proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381.


Issues:
WON the Court can take judicial notice of the journals.


Ruling:

Yes.

Act 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under existing law.
Rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal.

Page 793 of the Volume 7 of the Commission Journal of the 3rd Philippine Legislature states that:
“The Journal for Saturday, Feb. 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournemt sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.’

Section 7 of The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides that the Philippine Assembly shall keep a journal of its proceedings which shall be published. The journal of the Assembly’s proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears therein that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 in the midnight of February 28, 1914.

Section 275 of the Code of Civil procedure provides that the existence of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the US and the Philippine Islands shall be judicially recognized by the court without introduction of proof, but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence.

Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 220, provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings:

By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and

In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
It is well-settled in the US that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature og 1914. These journals are not ambiguous as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show with absolute certainty that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 in the midnight of February 28, 1914. To inquire into the veracity of the journals when they are clear and explicit would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence. We do not hesitate to follow the courts in the US since the Constitution of the PH Government is modeled after that of the US Federal Government. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and the court did not err in declining to go behind the journals.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
78 Phil 1

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the congressional resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto. Petitioners are 8 senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. Petitioners allege that the resolution is contrary to the Constitution.
The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Comelec as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress due to alleged irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition was filed. Consequently, the 3 senators and 8 representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary ¾ vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If the petitioners had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary ¾ vote in either House of Congress.

Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of the enrolled bill/resolution.

Petitioners contend that respondents are confusing jurisdiction (substantive law) with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution (evidence and practice).

Issue:

WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.

WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

Ruling:

No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress. If a political question conslusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.

Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 220, provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings:

By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and

In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals because those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the Court; and it had not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law.

Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2 ways specified in Section 313 of The Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the 2 documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

Tolentino v. Comelec
GR No. 148334

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ascended to the presidency, she nominated then Sen. Teofisto Guingona as VP which Congress confirmed. Sen. Guingona took his oath as VP on February 9, 2001. After the confirmation, the Senate passed Resolution No. 84 on February 8, 2001 certifying the vacancy in the Senate and calling Comelec to fill the vacancy though a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. The Resolution provided that the candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term for Sen. Guingona which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, Coemlec issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally claiming 13 candidates as elected Senators (election results have been canvassed except from Lanao del Norte). Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and 13th respectively in the resolution.

On June 20, 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition impleading only Comelec. Petitioners sought to enjoin Comelec from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single 3-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.

Petitioners contend that Comelec issued the resolution without jurisdiction because:
It failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645.

It failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code).

It failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4 paragraph 4 of RA 6646.
Because of these, petitioners argue that Comelec canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates without distinction such that there were no 2 separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for 13 seats. Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results (they cited the special elections held simultaneously with the regular elections on 1951 and 1955, where the canvassing and proclamation of winners were separate for the special and regular elections). The Court, without issuing any TRO, required Comelec to comment on the petition.
On July 20, 2001, after Comelec had canvassed the results from all provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring “official and final” the ranking of the 13 senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005, and the 13 senators took their oaths on July 23, 2001. In view of Resolution No. 01-006, The Court required the petitioners to file an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan which petitioners complied with. In their comments, Comelec , Honasan, and Recto claim that a special election was validly held. Comelec and Honasan raised preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and standing of the petitioners. Honasan claims that the petition is actually a quo warranto which the Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Recto claims that he is not a proper party because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer.

Issues:

WON the petition is in fact a quo warranto over which the SET is the sole judge.

WON the petition is moot.

WON petitioners have standing to litigate.

WON a special election to fill a vacant 3-year term Senate seat was validly held on May 14, 2001.

Ruling:

No. A quo warranto proceeding is one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to ouse him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Petitioners are questioning the validity of the special election on May 14, 2001. The petitioner does not seek to determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as senator. Petitioners’ prayer for annulment of Honasan’s proclamation and election is merely incidental to petitioners’ cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.

The petition may be moot, but the Court will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repition yet evading review such as in the case of Alunan III v. Mirasol. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to Comelec’s failure to comply with the requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election.
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing will bar the instant petition. The “general grievance” that petitioners assert is shares substantially by a large class of voters, if not all voters, who voted in the election. Neither did petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, allege that the petition should be given due course because in the special election held, tax money was spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuse of legislative power or that there was misapplication of funds by Comelec. However, the Court has relaxed the requirement of standing and has given due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage such as in the case of IBP v. Zamora. The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.

Yes. Under Section 9 Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Reps in the manner prescribed by law. To implement this provision, Congressed passed RA 6445. Section 4 of RA 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of RA 6645. Thus, in case of a vacancy in Congress at least 1 year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of RA 6645 requires Comelec:

To call a special election by fixing the date of the said election, which should not be earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy, but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and
To give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or officers to be voted for.

Upon checking the Comelec resolutions, they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, strict or substantial, with the requirements of Section 2 of RA 6645. Comelec did not give notice that it would hold a special election for a single 3-year term nor did it give notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.

However, this does not invalidate the special election. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. Section 2 of RA 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and Comelec’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.

The conclusion might be different had the case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of Reps. The time of the election is left to the discretion of Comelec. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of RA 6645 to call a special election not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled.

The required notice to the voters covers 2 matters:

That Comelec will hold a special election to fill a vacant single 3-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections.
That Comelec will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receicing the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.

Petitioners neither claimed nor proved that Comelec’s failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election. The absence of formal notice from Comelec does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which Comelec would determine the winner. The Court cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan in the absence of proof that Comelec’s omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election.

Neither is there basis in petitoners’ claim that the manner by which Comelec conducted the special election is null because Comelec failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. Comelec merely chose to adopt the Senate’s proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. Comelec’s decision to abandon the means it employed in the 1951 and 1955 special elections and adopt the method in Resolution No. 84 is a legitimate exercise of its discretion. That Comelec adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion.

Arroyo v. De Venecia
GR No. 127255

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the House of Reps, challenging the validity of RA 8420 amending certain provisions of the NIRC by imposing so-called “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petition is against Speaker of the House Jose De Venecia, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Floor Leader Rodolfo Albano, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the riles of the House which are “constitutionally mandated”, so their violation is tantamount to a constitutional violation.

The law originated in the House of Reps as HB 7198, was approved on 3rd reading on September 12, 1996, and transmitted to the Senate on September 16, 1996 which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile disagreeing provisions of both Houses. The bicam committee submitted its report to the House at 8AM on November 21, 1996. Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the committee on ways and means proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated. When Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was interpellating, he was interrupted when petitioner moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. The motion was objected and a roll call was done. Deputy Speaker Raul Daza decalred the presence of a quorum. Petitoner appealed but was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation proceeded.

Petitioner registered to interpellate and was 4th in order. Petitioner announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, never did. The transcript on the session on November 21, 1996 as published by Congress in the newspaper issues shows that when petitioner was asking the Speaker a question, the Speaker outright approved the bill acting on the motion by Rep. Albano. When petitioner tried to clarify, session was suspended by the Speaker. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker and the Senate President and certified by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are 4 different versions of the transcript:

The transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40pm.

The transcript of proceedings from 3:00pm – 3:40pm of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21.

The transcript of proceedings from 3:00pm – 3:40pm on November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of Transcription Division on November 28.

The published version in the newspapers.

Petitioners claim that the four versions differ on 3 points:

In the audio-sound, the word “approved” cannot be heard
.
In the transcript certified on Nov 21, the word “no” appears only once, while in other versions it is repeated 3 times.

The published version does not contain “you better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum.”

Petitioners argue that RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House:

The chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner from questioning the presence of a quorum (in violation of Rule VIII 35 and Rule XVII 103).

The Chair ignored petitioner’s question (in violation of Rule XIX 112).

The Chair refused to recognize petitioner and proceeded to act on motion of Rep. Albano (in violation of Rule XVI 97).

The Chair suspended the session without first ruling on petitioner’s question which was allegedly a point of order or privileged motion.

Respondents argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Respondents also argue that in passing the bill, the rules of the house were faithfully observed.

Issue:

WON the House of Reps committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240.


Ruling:
No. The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. It is clear that what is alleged to have been violated are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.
In Osmena v. Pendatun, the Court ruled that rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.

In US v. Ballin, Joseph, & Co., the rule stated was the Constitution (US) empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.

In City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the SC of Ohio rules that the provision for consideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not subject-matter of judicial inquiry.
According to Chief Justice Fernando, mere failure to conform to the rules of proceedings of Congress does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In the instant case, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House which the Court should not be concerned about. The claim was not that there was no quorum, but only that petitioner was prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Also, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of HB 7198 by the presiding officers and certification by the secretaries of both Houses that it was passed on November 21, 1996 is conclusive of its due enactment. When there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. To disregard the enrolled bill doctrine would be to disregard the respect due the other departments of the government.
Petitioners have not advanced any argument that warrants departure from the doctrine. The due enactment of the law is likewise confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on HB 7198 which became RA 8240 wa sapproved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by Section 16 Article VI of the Constitution. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.

Socrates v. Comelec
GR No. 154512

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez


Facts:

On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) at the Brgy. San Jose Gymnasium from 9:00am – 12:00noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates, petitioner, who assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30, 2011. Mark David Hagedorn, the president of the Association of Baranagy Captains was designated as interim chair. The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall and requested the Comelec to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days of receipt of the Recall Resolution. On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the Comelec a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution, but it was dismissed by the Comelec en banc on August 14, 2002. Comelec gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Comelec fixed the campaign period from August 27 to September 5, 2002 (10 days).

On August 23, 2002, Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.

On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly E. Gilo filed a petition before Comelec to disqualify Hagedorn and cancel his certificate of candidacy (and 2 other petitions were filed), on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a 4th consecutive term”, having been elected and having served mayor of the city for 3 consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.

In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the Comelec First Division dismissed for lack of merit the petitions and declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The Comelec also reset the election from September 7 to September 24, 2002.

G.R. NO. 154512

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the Comelec resolution dated August 14, 2002 which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that Comelec gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution on the following grounds:

Not all members of the PRA were notified.
The proof of service notice was palpably and legally deficient.
Members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their constituents.
The adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority.
The PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public’s constitutional right to information.

G.R. NO. 154683

Petitioner Vicente Sandoval Jr. seeks to annul Comelec Resolution 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002 and gave only the candidates a 10-day campaign period.

In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court directed the Comelec to give the candidates additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the Comelec en banc issued Resolution No 5708 giving the candidates additional 15 days to campaign and reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.

G.R. NO. 155083-84

Petitioners Adovo, Gilo, and Ollave assail the resolutions by Comelec dated September 20 and 23 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They argue that Comelec gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn’s qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a 4th consecutive term.

The Court, on September 23, 2002, ordered Comelec to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election. In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,338 votes, followed by Socrates with 17,220 votes, and Sandoval with 13,241 votes. Hagedorn then filed motions to lift the order restraining Comelec from proclaiming the winning candidate and allow him to assume office.

Issues:
Whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa (G.R. No. 154512).

Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002 (G.R. No. 155083-84).

Ruling:

In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the campaign period of only 10 days has become moot, since the Court has ordered Comelec to give the candidates additional 15 days to campaign.

No. The Court is bound by the findings of fact of the Comelec on matters within the competence and expertise of the Comelec. Comelec found that the proponents for the recall sent notices of the convening of PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Notices were also posted in conspicuous areas particularly at the Barangay Hall. Proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA. The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City also certified that upon a thorough and careful verification of the signatures in the Recall Resolution, majority of the members of the PRA approved said resolution.

Socrates also admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and event sent his representative and counsel who were present during the PRA proceedings. Socrates also had the right to examine public documents relative to the PRA such as the resolution, minutes, journal, and attendance sheets but he did not do so and he does not claim that Comelec denied him that right.

Yes. Section 8 Article X of the Constitution states that the term of elective officials shall be by 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service. Section 43(b) of RA 7160 or Local Government Code also provides that no local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service. After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a 4th term. The prohibition refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: (1) a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after 3 consecutive terms, and (2) the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a 4th term following 3 consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a 4th term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the 3rd consecutive term. Also, the framers of the Constitution did not intend the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his 3rd consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002. The period when Hagedorn was a private citizen was an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, because it was due to a legal prohibition which was involuntary. Also, Hagedorn’s recall does not retroact to include the tenure in the office of Socrates. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than 9 consecutive years comprising the recall term plus the regular three full terms.

Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

Petitioner was elected Representatives for the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 Congressional Elections. On January 15, 1990, petitioner filed with the Comelec a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM. Upon being informed of the filing, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps excluded petitioner’s name from the Roll of Members of the House of Reps pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states that any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one he is holding in permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy. Having lost in the ARMM elections, petitioner in a letter dated June 28, 1990 addressed to respondent Speaker expressed his intention to resume performing his duties and functions as elected Member of Congress, but he failed to regain his seat in Congress since this petition was filed on January 31, 1991.

In the petition, it is alleged that petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of Reps, not paid the emoluments due his office, his staff was dismissed and disbanded, and his office suites were occupied by other persons.

Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of ARMM, but maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67 Article IX of BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code is not operative under the present Constitution. He points out that the term of office of members of the House of Reps as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution.
Section 2 Article XVIII provides that Senators, Members of the House of Reps, and local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30 1992. Section 7 Article VI states that the Members of the House of Reps shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.

The grounds by which such term may be shortened are:

Section 13, Article VI – Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in government.

Section 16 – Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior.

Section 17 – Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal.

Section 7 par. 2 – Voluntary renunciation of office.

Petitioner asserts that under the principle expression unius est exclusion alterius, Section 67 Article IX of BP 81 is repugnant to the constitutional provisions since it provides for shortening of a congressman’s term of office on a ground not provided in the Constitution. Petitioner maintains that respondents acted without authority.

Respondents, through the OSG, contends that Section 67 Article IX of BP 881 is still operative, as the voluntary act of resignation in Section 67 falls within the term “voluntary renunciation” of office in par. 2 Section 7 of Article VI of the Constitution. The grounds provided in the Constitution is not exclusive. There are other modes such as resignation, death, and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.

Issues:

Is Section 67 Article IX of BP 881 still operative under the 1987 Constitution?
Could the respondents exclude the petitioner from the rolls of the House of Reps?


Ruling:
Yes. The basis for Section 67 Article IX of BP 881 is Section 1of Article XIII (Chapter on Accountability of Public Officers) of the 1973 Constitution which states that “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.” The same constitutional basis remains written in the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers states that “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” This provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position.

Also, that Section 67 is not mentioned in the Constitution as a mode of shortening the tenure of office does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 Article IX provides that “All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.” Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the 4 grounds found in Article VI are not exclusive.

To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.

As the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position presently held, it is not necessary that the other position be actually held. Section 13 Article VI of the Constitution is different from Section 67 Article IX of BP 881.

Yes. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner’s name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67. When the Comelec communicated to the House of Reps that petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear legal effect of Section 67. It was their ministerial duty.

Morales v. Subido
27 SCRA 131

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

Petitioner Enrique Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo papa on March 14, 1968, petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila and given a provisional appointment to the same position by the Mayor of Manila. On September 24, 1968, respondent CSC Commissioner Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864) states:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency – No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the AFP or NBI, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least 3 years, or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the mayor to Section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 which requires the filing of a vacancy within 30 days after coming into existence. In response, the petitioner in a letter demanded that respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as chief of police of the city. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but respondent refused to reconsider, hence this petition.

Below is the petitioner’s reading of Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966:

No person may be a chief of a city police agency unless he

Holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the AFP OR NBI; OR
Has served as chief of police with exemplary record; OR
Has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least 3 years; OR
Any high school graduate who has served as officer in the AFP for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Petitioner contends that since he has served as captain, major, and lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, he falls under the third class of persons qualified as chief of a city police department.

MAIN DECISION

The Court ruled in its main decision that an applicant should have the required service and educational qualification (bachelor’s degree) to be appointed as chief of a city police department.
The requirement of a college degree as additional qualification is compatible with the policy of the statute which is place the local police service in a professional level. The last paragraph of Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 states:

When no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made provided that the appointee possesses the above educational qualification and that the appointment should not extend beyond 6 months except for a valid cause approved by the CSC.

The Act makes it unequivocal that possession of a college degree or a high school diploma is an indispensable requirement. That the purpose is to require both educational and service qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police is evident from a reading of the original provision of HB 6951 and the successive revisions it underwent. Section 12 of HB 6951 (now Section 10 of Police Act of 1966) reads:

Minimum Qualification for appointment as Chief of a Police Agency – No chief of police agency of a province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor’s degree in police administration or holder of a bachelor’s degree who served either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least 3 years shall be eligible for appointment to the position of the police agency.

In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization to which HB 6951 was referred reported a substitute measure to which Section 10 of the Police Act owes its present form and substance. Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at least 3 years.

At the behest of Sen. Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase “has served as officer in the Armed Forces was inserted and thus it read:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the AFP or the NBI or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least 3 years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

However, somewhere in the legislative process, the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained. The writer, upon checking the enrolled bill, found that the text of Section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. It was signed by the secretaries and presiding officers of both Houses. Under the enrolled bill theory announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, the text in the enrolled bill must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the Courts. This means that a high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.

RESOLUTION

The petitioner insisted that the version of the provision as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo was the version approved by the Senate on third reading. According to him, the House bill division deleted the entire provision and substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966. It would appear that the omission, whether deliberate or unintended, of the phrase “who has served the police department of a city or” was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill specifically in the proofreading thereof, and that the change was made not by Congress but buy an employee thereof.

Issue:
WON the enrolled bill is controlling.

Ruling:

Yes.

The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute. The Court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress.

In Marshall Field v. Clark, the US SC rules that the signing of the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress is an official attestation by the two Houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress.

In Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, an enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of discrepancy.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN
109 Phil 863

Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez

Facts:

On July 14, 1960, petitioner Congressman Sergio Osmena Jr. filed a petition before the SC against respondents Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and 14 other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by HR 59. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity. The pertinent portions of HR 59 are as follows:

On June 23, 1960, petitioner accused then President Garcia in a privilege speech that “free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. Even pardons are for sale, and the culprit can always be bailed out as long as he can come across with a handsome dole.”
The charges of the petitioner, if made recklessly and without basis, would constitute a serious assault on the dignity and prestige of the Office of the President which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people.

A special committee of 15 members to be appointed by the Speaker is created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President, and is authorized to summon Cong. Osmena to appear before it to substantiate his charges as well as issue subpoena to require attendance of witnesses or production of pertinent papers. If Cong. Osmena fails to do so, require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the special session of Congress.

Petitioner alleged that:

The resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered.
His words constituted no actionable conduct.

After his objectionable speech, the House took up other business, and according to Rule XVII Section 7 of the Rules of the House, if other business has intervened after a Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor.

The House has no power under the Constitution to suspend one of its members.

The majority of the Court decided to hear the case and required respondents to answer without issuing any preliminary injunction. The special committee continued to perform its task, and submitted its report on July 18, 1960 finding petitioner guilty of serious disorderly behavior. The House approved on the same day HR 175, declaring petitioner guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for 15 months.

On July 19, 1960, respondents filed their answer to the instant petition, challenged the jurisdiction of the SC to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld HR 175 and emphasized that since Congress had ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee had ceased to exist.

Issue:

WON the Court can prevent Congress from punishing or disciplining one of its members for his serious allegations against the President in one of his speeches.


Ruling:

Yes.

Parliamentary Immunity under Section 15, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. The same provision in our Constitution was taken from Sec.6 Clause 1 of Article 1 of the US Constitution, and in that country, is has always been understood to mean that though exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, members thereof may nonetheless by questioned in Congress itself.

For unparliamentarily conduct, members of Congress have been censured, imprisoned, suspended, or even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. In fact, the Philippine Senate suspended a senator for 1 year in April 1949.

On whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct, the Court believes that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for adjudication by the courts. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. The Court refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which is their special duty to maintain.

In Clifford v. French, the SC of California ruled that the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department. Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.

Courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and the courts have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In Alejandrino v. Quezon, the Court rules that the Senate had no power to suspend its members because it would be tantamount to removal, and the organic law Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member. HOWEVER, that remark should be understood to refer particularly to an appointive senator. At that time, the Legislature only had those powers which were granted to it by the Jones Law. Now, the Congress has full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation except as restricted by the Constitution, including legislative prerogative of suspension.
However, as the House has already closed its session, the Committee has ceased to exist, and the case should be dismissed for having moot and academic.