USA v. Ruiz (G.R. No. L-35645) Case Digest

USA v. Ruiz

G.R. No. L-35645

May 22, 1985

Facts:

The United States of America used to have a naval base in Subic, Zambale as provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and USA. In May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects:

· Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the US Naval Station

· Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay

One of those who responded to the invitation to bid was Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. In its complaint, it alleged that USA had accepted its bid because the latter requested to confirm a price proposal. The company took this as a confirmation of the proposal. However, in a letter by William Collins, the director of Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, the company was informed that it did not qualify to receive the award for the projects because of a previous unsatisfactory performance on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the US Naval Station at Subic.

Eligio de Guzman & Co. sued the United States as well as some of its officers. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the company to work on the projects an in the event that performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also sought for a preliminary injunction to restrain UA from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

What the United States wants is to restrain the respondent Judge Ruiz from trying the civil case.

Issue:

May the United States be sued in this case?

Ruling:

No. The rule on State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules on international law are constantly developing and evolving, which made it necessary to distinguish the activities of States. The activities of the States are categorized into sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). State immunity now extends only to act jure imperii. The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act. In this case, the contract was clearly for acts jure impreii, not jure gestionis. Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction to try the case.

Republic v. Villasor (G.R. No. L-30671)

Republic v. Villasor

G.R. No. L-30671

November 28, 1973

Facts:

On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in favor of P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino inchuan, and International Construction Corporation against the Republic of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). On June 24, 1969, Judge Guillermo Villasor issued an order declaring the that the decision for the AFP to pay Php1,712,396.40 was final and executory. The Alias Writ of Execution was served by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, Quezon City, on several banks. The funds sought to be garnished were allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.

Issue:

Can the funds be validly levied upon?

Ruling:

No. The State may not be sued without its consent. From this, public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Even if the money sought to be garnished is due to government employees, the fact that it is in the hands of public officers makes it not liable to the creditors in the process of garnishment. To subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.

Bengson III v. HRET (G.R. No. 142840) Case Digest

Bengson III v. HRET

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

Facts:

· April 27, 1960

o Teodoro Cruz was born a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in Tarlac

o Both his parents are Filipino

· November 5, 1985

o Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of PH and took an oath of allegiance to USA

o As per CA 63, Section 1(4), he lost his PH citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country

· June 5, 1990

o Cruz was naturalized as a US citizen

· March 7, 1994

o Cruz acquired PH citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630

· 1998

o Cruz ran for and was elected as representative of the 2^nd district of Pangasinan

o He defeated Antonio Bengson III

· Bengson III filed a petition for quo warranto ad cautelam

o Contention: Cruz is not qualified to be a member of HRET since he is not a natural-born citizen under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution, which provides

No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of

age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in

the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less

than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Issue:

Can Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?

Ruling:

Yes. A natural-born citizen is one who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth and (2) by naturalization.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of PH citizenship.

Naturalization

1. As a mode of initially acquiring PH citizenship

· Governed by CA 473

2. As a mode of reacquiring PH citizenship

· Governed by CA 63

CA 63 enumerates 3 modes by which PH citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. By naturalization

2. By repatriation

3. By direct act of Congress

Repatriation may be reacquired by those who lost citizenship due to the following:

1. Desertion of the armed forces

2. Service in the armed forces of the Allied forces in WWII

3. Service in the US armed forces at any other time

4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien

5. Political and economic necessity

The effect of repatriation is the recovery of the original nationality.

According to Section 1 of RA 2630, Cruz may reacquire his PH citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the local civil registry. Thus, Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, which he reacquired at birth.

Coquilla v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 151914) Case Digest

Coquilla v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 151914

July 31, 2002

Facts:

· February 17, 1938

o Teodoro Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar

· 1965

o Coquilla joined the US Army and was naturalized as a US citizen

o He remained in America but visited the Philippines thrice from 1970 to 1973.

· October 15, 1998

o Coquilla came to the PH and took out a residence certificate.

· November 7, 2000

o Coquilla’s application for repatriation under RA 8171 was approved.

· November 10, 2000

o Coquilla took his oath as a Filipino citizen

· November 21, 2000

o Coquilla registered as a voter in Oras, Eastern Samar.

· January 12, 2001

o His application was approved by the Election Registration Board

· February 27, 2001

o Coquilla filed a certificate of candidacy, stating that he had been a resident of the Philippines for two years.

· Neil Alvarez, Coquilla’s rival, sought the cancellation of the latter’s certificate

o Contention: Coquilla had only resided for about six months since November 10, 2000 when he took his oath.

· COMELEC was not able to render judgment before the May 14, 2001 elections, wherein Coquilla won.

· July 19, 2001

o COMELEC granted Alvarez’s petition

o COMELEC’s ruling: Coquilla’s regular trips to the PH cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of USA prior to November 10, 2000. The one-year residency requirement contemplates actual residence of the citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected.

Issues:

1. Did COMELEC lose the authority to act on the petition of Alvarez since it did not give a ruling before the elections?

2. Was Coquilla a resident of Oras, Samar at least one year before the elections?

3. Coquilla contended that he was only compelled to adopt US citizenship. Is this tenable?

4. Was Coquilla’s registration as voter of Samar in January 2001 conclusive of his residency as candidate?

Ruling:

1. No. According to Section 6 of RA 6646, the candidates who are not disqualified by final judgment may be voted on, but the COMELEC may suspend the proclamation when the ground for disqualification is strong.

2. No. RA 7160, Section 39(a) provides that the candidate must be a resident for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. The term “residence” is to be understood NOT as “dwelling” or “habitation” but as domicile or legal residence.

· Domicile – the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)

· Domicile of origin – domicile acquired at birth

Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a US citizen. Until November 10, 2000, Coquilla was an alien without any right to reside in the PH. Residence is a requirement in becoming a US citizen according to Title 8, Section 1427 of the US Code. The naturalization in a foreign country results in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

3. No. Coquilla was repatriated under RA 8171, which provides repatriation for natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He was not repatriated based on RA 2630, which applies to repatriation of those who lost PH citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States.

He had the following options for waiving his status as non-resident, but he did not avail of them:

1. Obtaining an immigrant visa under Section 13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948

· This waives his status as a non-resident

2. Acquire PH citizenship by naturalization under CA 473

3. Repatriation OR by an act of Congress

· Availed when one is a former PH national

· He waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien

4. No. According to Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code, a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the elections. It was held in Nuval v. Guray that registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.

Thus, the statement in Coquilla’s COC that he had been a resident of the Philippines is not true. COMELEC is justified in ordering the cancellation of the COC as per Section 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Lee v. Director of Lands (G.R. No. 128195) Case Digest

Lee v. Director of Lands

G.R. No. 128195

October 3, 2001

Facts:

· March 1936

o Rafael, Carmen, et al., all surnamed Dinglasan, sold to Chinese citizen Lee Liong a parcel of land situated at Roxas City.

· 1948

o the former owners filed an annulment of sale and recovery of land

o Reason: The Constitution prohibits against aliens owning private lands

o Ruling of Supreme Court: Sale is null and void but the original owners can’t have the title because they also violated the Constitution. They are in pari delicto.

· 1993

o Filipino citizens Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee, who are the widows of the sons of Lee Liong, filed a petition for reconstitution. Both Elizabeth and Pacita acquired the land from their husbands.

o They alleged that on December 9, 1948, a certification of a transfer title over the property was issued in the name of Lee Liong but was burned during the war. However, Elizabeth and Pacita did not show an evidence of owner’s duplicate copy.

o Ruling of the RTC: Order of reconstitution is granted.

· 1995

o Solicitor General filed for a petition of judgment in the reconstitution case

o Reason: RTC Roxas had no jurisdiction over the case

o Contention: Petitioners are not the proper party because Lee Liong did not acquire the title of the land because he is Chinese

o Ruling of the CA: Reconstitution judgment is void.

Issues:

1. Who was the proper party to assail the legality of the sale?

2. Was the Solicitor General estopped because he filed the case 60 years after?

3. Can the Solicitor General escheat the estate now that the land is owned by Filipinos?

4. Was the reconstitution valid?

Ruling:

1. The Solicitor General is the proper party to assail the legality of the sale. Both vendor and vendee are in pari delicto for violating the Constitution, and the courts will not afford protection to either party.

2. No. The SolGen is not estopped because prescription never lies against the State.

3. No. The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. If the land was invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is valid.

4. No. The petitioners failed to present the owner’s duplicate of the title. The order of restitution is void for lack of factual support.

Republic v. de la Rosa Case Digest

Republic v. de la Rosa

G.R. No. 104654

G.R. No. 105715

G.R. No. 105735

June 6, 1994

Facts:

History

Frivaldo alleged that because of the precarious political atmosphere in the Philippines during martial law, he was compelled to seek a political asylum in the United States and to eventually renounce his citizenship. He claimed that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, but he was informed that this applied only to Filipino women who married foreigners. Meanwhile, his request for Congressional sponsorship allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize. So he sought the remedy of the Revised Naturalization Law.

Naturalization

On September 20, 1991, Juan Frivaldo filed for naturalization. In an order dated October 7, 1991, the judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992. He further directed the following: (1) publication of the said order of petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks, and (2) the posting of a copy of the order and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC in Manila.

His petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law. This includes the following:

1. That the petitioner is of good moral character

2. That he has resided continuously in the Philippines for at least 10 years

3. That he is able to speak and write English and any of the principal dialects

4. That he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship

5. That he has filed a declaration of intention or id he is excused from said filing, the justification thereof

On January 14, 1992, Frivaldo filed a Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion was granted, and the hearing proceeded on February 21, 1992. Six days after the hearing, the judge rendered the decision that stated Frivaldo has been readmitted as a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization, vesting upon him all rights and privileges of a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Petitions

On March 16, Quiterio Hermo alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects. On May 22, 1992, Frivaldo was proclaimed as the winner. Raul Lee also filed a petition to seek for the annulment of the proclamation of Frivaldo as Governor-elect of Sorsogon. He contended that Frivaldo was still an American citizen in 1987 when he registered as voter.

Issue:

Can Frivaldo a citizen of the Philippines at the time of the elections?

Ruling:

No. Frivaldo, opting to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.

Frivaldo failed to comply with the requirements of CA 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) because of the following:

· He did not comply with Section 9 which provides that both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional.

· Frivaldo’s petition for naturalization lacked the allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of CA 473. This absence is fatal to the petition.

· The petition is also not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of Frivaldo as required by Section 7 of CA 473.

· He also did not attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of CA 473.

In terms of the proceedings of the trial court, the following irregularities were found:

· The hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing and the petition itself

· The petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition

· Frivaldo was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment

· Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance without the two-year waiting period

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision.

The Court ruled that Frivaldo is NOT a Filipino citizen and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC Case Digest

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 221697

G.R. Nos. 221698-700

March 8, 2016

Facts:

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamnzares (Grace Poe) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in a church in Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar on September 2, 1968. The parental care and custody of Grace was then transferred by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Three days later, Emiliano reported Grace as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar (OCR). When she was five years old, Grace was adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (aka FPJ) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces). On May 13, 1974, the trial court granted the petition for adoption. Although necessary notations were made by the OCR, Susan Roces discovered only sometimes in 2005 that the lawyer who handled Grace Poe’s adoption failed to secure a new certificate of live birth, indicating Grace’s new name and the name of her adoptive parents. In 2006, the OCR issued a new certificate of live birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. When she turned 18, Grace Poe registered as a voter in San Juan City.

Marriage and Naturalization

On July 27, 1991, Grace married Teodoro Misael Daniel Llamnzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the United States. The couple flew to America on July 29, 1991. Grace gave birth to Brian Daniel in the USA on 1992, while her daughters Hanna MacKenzie and Jesusa Anika were born in the Philippines in 1998 and 2004, respectively. Grace Poe became a naturalized American citizen on October 18, 2001.

Return to the Philippines

On December 13, 2004, Grace came back to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating health. She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to take care of her father’s funeral arrangements. In her desire to be with her mother, she decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. They began preparing for their resettlement including the transfer of schools for her children.

Properties Acquired

In the second half of 2005, Grace and her husband purchased a condominium unit at One Wilson Place in San Juan City. In early 2006, Teodoro Llamanzares acquired a 509-square meter lot in Quezon City where they built their family home. Up to the date of the promulgation of the decision, Grace and her family are living there.

Repatriation

On July 7, 2006, Grace Poe took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003). She then filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children with the Bureau of Immigration. Grace then registered again as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on august 31, 2006.

On October 6, 2010, Grace was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III as chairperson of the MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship on October 20, 2010 in satisfaction of the requisites under RA 9225.

On July 12, 2011, Grace Poe executed before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States. She accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the US Vice Consul that states her intent of relinquishing her American citizenship. On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul issued Grace a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.

Senatorial Post

On October 2, 2012, Grace filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 elections, wherein she answered 6 years and 6 months to the question “period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” She obtained the highest number of votes and became a Senator on May 16, 2013.

Presidential Candidacy

On October 15, 2015, Grace Poe filed her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections. In her COC, she declared that she was a natural-born citizen and that she resided in the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016 for 10 years and 11 months, counted from May 24, 2005.

Various petitions were filed, questioning the eligibility of Grace Poe as a candidate for presidency.

Issue:

Is Grace Poe qualified to run for presidency?

Ruling:

Yes. What was questioned by the petitions filed against her were her residency and citizenship. These will be discussed below.

On Citizenship

Statistics and Physical Features

Grace Poe’s citizenship was questioned because she was a foundling, so her real citizenship is unknown. The Court ruled, however, that Poe’s Filipino citizenship is demonstrable. The Court relied on the statistical probability that Poe is of Filipino descent. In 1970, there were 99.56% Filipino females born in the Philippines. Therefore, there is a great chance that Grace is a Filipino. Furthermore, Grace’s features were taken into consideration. She has Filipino features: height, nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond-shaped eyes, and an oval face. The probability and the evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Legislative Intent of the 1935 Constitution

In addition, although the 1935 Constitution was silent as to the citizenship of foundlings, it was found that during the deliberations, the lawmakers intended the enumeration to include natural children of unknown parentage. The reason why foundlings were not included in the enumeration is that their number was not enough to merit specific mention. The constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy.

Status of Being Natural-Born

Under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. “Having to perform an act” means that the act must be done personally by the citizen. In the case of foundlings, the determination of status is done by authorities, not by the foundling.

Rule Under International Law

Foundlings are citizens under international law. By virtue of transformation or incorporation, international laws may be made binding in the Philippines. The following international laws were cited by the court:

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

· Provides that everyone has a right to nationality

2. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

· Provides that a child has the right to acquire a nationality

3. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

· Provides for the right of every child to acquire a nationality

All these laws obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.

Furthermore, the following principles were also cited by the court. It should be noted that these are not yet ratified by the Philippines at the time of the promulgation of the decision but were nevertheless applied since they are generally accepted principles of international law.

1. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws

· Provides that “a child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth.”

2. 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

· Provides that a foundling shall be presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found

Effect of Repatriation

COMELEC contended that upon repatriation, Grace Poe did not reacquire her status as a natural-born citizen. The Court said that this issue has already been settled in the case of Bengson III v. HRET, where it was ruled that repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.

On Residence

Starting Point of Counting

The Court ruled that Grace Poe’s claim that she will have been a resident for 10 years and 11 months is true. This period was counted from May 25, 2005, when she returned for good from the United States. The petitioners questioning her residency contended that the period should have been counted from July 2006, when her petition to reacquire Filipino citizenship was approved.

The court ruled that the three requisites of acquiring a new domicile are present in Grace Poe’s case: (1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. Grace Poe presented numerous evidences that prove she had complied with the requisites since May 2005.

Balikbayan

COMELEC pointed out that Grace Poe returned to the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan under RA 6768. However, the court ruled that the Republic Act shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. The law institutes a baikbayan program providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the Philippines. Given the law’s express policy, it would be unduly harsh to conclude in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year.

On the Senatorial COC

Grace Poe explained in the pleadings that she had committed an honest mistake when she filled up her COC for the senatorial elections because she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before May 13, 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC.

The Court ruled in her favor, citing Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, which held that a candidate’s mistake as to period of residence made in a COC is overcome by evidence.

Thus, Grace Poe was declared by the court as qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of May 9, 2016.

Republic v. Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 70853) Case Digest

Republic v. Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70853

March 12, 1987

Facts:

On January 22, 1970, Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Land Authority for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots with a total area of 1,364 hectares. The land was situated in Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property from a certain Victor Gardiola by virtue of a contract of sale dated May 31, 1952.

On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90, reserving some lands for resettlement purposes. This was under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Feliciano alleged that his land was used for the resettlement. He prayed that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal, valid, and subsisting.

Judge Rafael Sison rendered a decision, declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of 701.9 hectares, to be the private property of Feliciano. A motion to intervene was filed by 86 settlers, but they did not appear during the presentation of evidence and instead submitted a motion for postponement, which the trial court denied.

However, on December 10, 1971, Judge Miguel Navarro issued an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the order denying the intervenors’ motion for postponement. The case, therefore, was reopened. On August 21, 1980, Judge Esteban Lising issued an order to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Solicitor General agreed with Judge Lising contending that the State may not be sued and also that the existence and/or authenticity of the purported possessory information had not been demonstrated.

Issue:

Can the State be sued in this case?

Ruling:

No. The doctrine of non-suability of the state has proper application in this case. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem but an action in personam. This means that it is an action against the specific party, resulting to Feliciano’s suing of the State itself.

There is no showing that the State has consented to be sued. Furthermore, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent, which is a fatal defect. On the other hand, the State’s failure to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried is not fatal because it is settled that such defense may be invoked by the courts at any stage of the proceedings.

Feliciano contended that the Proclamation shows the consent of the State to be sued when it established the reservation “subject to private rights, if any there be.” The Court said that the consent of the State cannot be drawn from the language of the proclamation. The waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly but must be construed strictissimi juris(the strictest letter of the law). Moreover, the proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority.

There were also doubts as to the genuineness of the informacion posesoria. Under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it is a means to record a claimant’s actual possession of a piece of land. Thus, it shows only that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land. Also, possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares, whereas the land claimed was 1,364 hectares.

PNB v. Court of Industrial Relations (G.R. No. L-32667) Case Digest

PNB v. Court of Industrial Relations

G.R. No. L-32667

January 31, 1978

Facts:

Gabriel Manansala, the counsel for United Homesite Employees and Laborers Assoociation, was previously issued a writ of execution. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation. The writ of execution, however, was challenged on two grounds:

1. The appointment of Gilbert Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law

2. The funds subject to the garnishment is public in character.

Lorenzo is the Clerk of Court. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moved to quash the notice of garnishment, citing Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, stating “All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.” PNB argues that it should be the sheriff of Quezon City, not the clerk of court, who has the authority to serve the garnishment.

Issues:

1. Does Lorenzo have the authority to serve the writ of execution?

2. Can the funds be levied?

Ruling:

1. Yes. Under Commonwealth Act No. 103, the Clerk of Court is the ex-officio sheriff. Thus, he/she has the authority to serve the writ of execution. Furthermore, what is important is that the judgment be executed.

2. No. The People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be sued. The State’s non-suability cannot be applied here. The organization has a personality of its own. When the government enters into a commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. It has to be subjected to the rules of law governing private corporations.

Amigable v. Cuenca (G.R. No. L-26400) Case Digest

Amigable v. Cuenca

G.R. No. L-26400

February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees

Facts:

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. She had a transfer certificate title issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, 6,167 square meters of land was used for the construction the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

On March 27, 1958, AMigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting the payment for her lot. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General and was disallowed it in his 9^thIndorsement dated December 9, 1958.

Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the portion of the lot used. In answer, the defendants interposed the following defenses:

1. The action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the office of the Auditor General

2. The right of action for the recovery of the any amount which might be due to Amigable had already prescribed.

3. The action being a suit to the government, the claim for moral damages and other costs have no valid basis since the government did not give its consent to be sued.

4. Since it was only the province of Cebu who had misappropriated the lot, Amigable has no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue:

Can Amigable properly sue the government?

Ruling:

Yes. In its decision, the Court cited Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, which also involved a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.