It's a Ping Thing

De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110
November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
Antonia Loanco was hired as cashier in the barbershop of Vicente Mendoza, Cesar Syquia’s brother-in-law. Cesar then courted Antonia, and the latter became pregnant with a baby boy who was born on June 17, 1931. During Antonia’s pregnancy, Cesar was always visiting her. On February 1931, he wrote a letter to the priest who was to christen the baby boy, saying

Rev. Father,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

He wrote this on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan. While he was abroad, Cesar wrote several letters to Antonia Loanco, showing paternal interest in the situation and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that junior might be strong. The baby boy, however, was not named Cesar Syquia, Jr., but Ismael Loanco. After giving birth, Cesar took Antonia to a house in Manila, and they lived together for about a year in regular family style. Cesar paid for all the household expenses during their living together. Then Antonia became pregnant for the second time. However, Cesar got married to another woman.

The purpose of the petition filed by Antonia and her mother is to recover from Cesar Php30,000 as damages for the breach of promise to marry, to compel Syquia to recognize Ismael and Pacita (Antonia’s second child) as natural children, and to make him pay for the maintenance of the children worth Php500 per month.

Issues:
1. Is the note to the priest a proof of acknowledgment of paternity within the meaning of Article 135 (1) of the (Old) Civil Code?

2. Does the acknowledgment referred to in Article 135 of the Old Civil Code need to be made in a single document?

3. Can Antonia be granted payment for damages because of breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:
1. Yes. Article 135 (1) states

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence

A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The problem of the recognition of the child even before he was born is no different from that when he is already born. The words used by Syquia in his letter are not capable of two constructions, and the identity of the baby was clear.

2. No. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one or any particular individual. The only requirement is that the writing should be indubitable. Thus, the many letters Cesar Syquia wrote may be made proof to his acknowledgment of Ismael Loanco.

3. No. Such promise to marry was not satisfactorily proved and the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

Manzanal v. Ilusorio
G.R. No. 189311
December 6, 2010

DENNIS R. MANZANAL and BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, Petitioners
vs.
RAMON K. ILUSORIO, Respondent

Facts:
On July 7, 1994, a penthouse at the Baguio Country Club (BCCC) building was assigned by Felix Adolfo Lopez, Jr., with the conformity of BCCC, to Ramon Ilusorio. Ilusorio had lived there for years, but conflict within his family arose in 1998. Suddenly, he was barred from using the unit and was almost expelled as member of the club. Ilusorio sent a letter to BCCC to request for his current statement of account. BCCC replied and charged him with Php102,076.74, which he paid under protest.

Then he requested a breakdown of the amount, which BCCC, through Dennis Manzanal, complied with. In the answer, the breakdown amounted to Php2,928,223.26. Because this was much bigger than what Ilusorio paid, BCCC demanded that he pay the unpaid charges. Out of the more than 2.9 million breakdown, 2.4 million was billed for Ilusorio’s sponsorship of guests from April 1995 to July 1999. In Ilusorio’s reply to Manzanal’s letter of demand, he did not contradict the fact that his work partners and employees used his unit, admitting that he welched on his undertaking in the contract that only family members are allowed free usage. Ilusorio, however, said that he should not be charged for the use of the unit as he is entiled to its use and enjoyment being the owner thereof.

Because of the constant demand letters, Ilusorio took the matter to the Regional Trial Court. He felt that the demand letters were a form of harassment from his family, so he filed a complaint for damages. Instead of answering, Manzanal filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, which the trial court granted. Manzanal explained that the act of sending a demand letter does not constitute a cause of action against the obligee or creditor. However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision.

Issues:
Was the complaint for damages filed by Ramon Ilusorio against petitioner Dennis Manzanal and Baguio City Country Club Corporation state a cause of action?
Can BCCC collect the unpaid balance from Ilusorio?

Ruling:
No. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, entitling the injured party to relief. Its existence is determined from the allegations in the complaint. To sustain Ilusorio’s assertions that his complaint states a cause of action would be to rule that the act of sending a demand letter by itself constitutes a cause of action. The Court found that the demand letters did not deviate from the standard practice of pursuing the satisfaction of a club member’s obligations.

Yes. The Supreme Court cited Cebu Country Club, Inc., v. Elizagaque, which also cites Article 19 in relation with Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provide

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

As an exclusive organization that derives life from membership fees and charges, BCCC is expected to enforce claims from members in default of their contractual obligations.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. There is a need to connect Article 19 with Article 21 because the former does not provide a remedy for its violation.

Cebu Country Club Inc., v. Elizagaque 
G.R. No. 160273
January 18, 2008

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L.LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent

Facts:
Cebu Country Club is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club. Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary of CCCI, designated Ricardo Elizagaque, its senior vice-president and operations manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. In 1996, Elizagaque filed an application for proprietary membership. He purchased a share for Php3 million. Unknown to Elizagaque, however, was that the club had amended their by-laws in which a unanimous vote of the directors is required before an applicant may be admitted. This amendment was not reflected in the application form Elizagaque filled up. The Board adopted a black ball system in which the directors would drop a white ball when they approve of the applicant and a black one if they do not. During the voting, there was one black ball, which means the unanimous decision was not satisfied.

On August 1, 1997, Elizagaque received a letter from CCCI’s corporate secretary, informing him that the board disapproved his application for proprietary membership. Elizagaque, through Edmundo Misa, wrote a letter of reconsideration, but no reply came. They wrote two more times, but CCCI still did not reply. On December 1998, Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages against CCCI.

Issue:
Is Elizagaque entitled to payment of damages?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court cited Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in its decision.

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

It was shown that Elizagaque’s letters remained unanswered and he was not even made aware of the club’s new rules. In defense of the failure to print a new application form with the amendments added, CCCI said that it was not able to print the updated form because of economic reasons. Being an exclusive golf club, it is unbelievable that the club would not be able to pay for printing costs of the updated application forms.

The Court found that CCCI violated the rules governing human relations and is thus liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Manaloto v. Veloso III
G.R. No. 171365
October 6, 2010

Facts:
This case stems from an unlawful detainer case filed by Ermelinda Manaloto et al., who are the lessors to of residential house, which was leased to respondent Ismael Veloso III at the rate of Php17,000 per month. The action for unlawful detainer was instituted because of Veloso’s failure to pay the monthly rent from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite the petitioner’s repeated demands. Veloso, however, denied the nonpayment of rentals, alleging that he made advance payments when he spent Php825,000 for the repairs done on the leased property.

While the case was still on appeal, the petitioner lessors published the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, who ruled in favor of the lessors. Copies of the decision were distributed to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village, which caused Veloso to be the talk of the town and his good name to be greatly damaged.

Issue:
Were the petitioners correct in publishing the MeTC’s decision while the case was still on appeal?

Ruling:
No. The petitioners are obliged to respect the respondent’s good name even though they are opposing parties in a detainer case. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. Petitioners are also expected to respect Veloso’s dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind under Article 26 of the Civil Code.

Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

Roehr v. Rodriguez et al.
G.R. No. 142820
June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

Facts:
Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980, in Germany. They had two daughters. On August 28, 1996, Carmen filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage at the Makati RTC, but the petition was denied. Meanwhile, Wolfgang Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The custody of the two children was granted to Wolfgang by the said court.

Because of this, Wolfgang filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999, on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter since there is already a divorce decree obtained abroad. Judge Guevara-Salonga granted the motion to dismiss. Carmen, however, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the case should proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of their children and the distribution of the properties. The judge issued an order partially setting aside her order to dismiss for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as the custody of the children.

Issue:
Can our courts take cognizance of the custody issue of the children?

Ruling:
Yes. First, it is important to point out that the divorce was validly obtained and is recognized in the Philippines. It has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. In this case, the divorce decree has not been questioned by either party. Only the custody of the children is doubted.

While the court in Germany that granted the divorce decree has decided regarding the custody of the children, as a general rule, the legal effects of divorce, even if obtained abroad, must still be determined by our courts. This includes issues on custody and care and support of children. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court. It should be noted that the proceedings in the German court were merely summary. It cannot be said that Carmen Rodriguez was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. While Wolfgang was represented by two counsels, Rodriguez had no lawyers to assist her in the proceedings.

In addition, the divorce decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.

Thus, the court may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children.

Republic v. Orbecido III
G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005

Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States, bringing one of their children with her. A few years later, Cirpriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, and sometime in 2000, he learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and was remarried to Innocent Stanley. Because of this, Cipriano filed a petition for authority to remarry, invoking Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines which states

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the said provision cannot be applicable in this case since Article 26 talks about mixed marriages, i.e., that of a Filipino to a foreigner. However, this was not the case in Cipriano and Lady Myros’ marriage since both were Filipinos at the time of the marriage

Issue:
1. Does paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply in this case?

2. Can Cipriano remarry?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court looked at the legal intent of the provision and found out that the Civil Code Revision Committee’s intent in including Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse is deemed to remain married to the foreigner when, after obtaining the divorce, the foreigner is no longer married to the Filipino. The Court then set the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2, Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The Court made it clear that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. Hence, since Lady Myros was already an American citizen at the time she obtained the divorce abroad, Article 26 may be applied to the case.

2. Yes. As stated earlier, Lady Myros obtained the divorce in the United States at the time when she was already an American citizen. This makes her divorce valid and has in fact incapacitated her to remarry. Cipriano, then, can also remarry as provided in Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

Garcia v. Recio
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent

Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. He then married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. On October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately even without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.

Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on March 2, 1998, on the grounds of bigamy. She contended that Rederick’s previous marriage was still subsisting at the time she contracted a marriage with him. She claimed that she learned of Rederick’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November 1997. However, Rederick said that he had told Grace about his previous marriage and the dissolution thereof. On July 7, 1998, Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. In this case, the Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

Issue:
Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

Ruling:
The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following reasons. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino spouse can be allowed to remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce would be capacitated to remarry because of the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws must be alleged and proved.

There are two basic types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The Court could not determine which type of divorce Rederick had acquired in Australia because of insufficient evidence.

The Australian law provision stated in the facts led the Court to believe that Rederick’s divorce might have been restricted. Hence, his capacity to remarry has not been proven. Thus, the Court had to remand the case to find conclusive evidence. However, the Court also ordered that if there is no proof shown that Rederick had the capacity to remarry, then the court a quo may declare the nullity of the marriage on the ground of bigamy since there are already two marriages contracted.

Republic v. Crasus L. Iyoy
G.R. No. 152577
September 21, 2005

Facts:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines and went to the United States, leaving their five children. Sometime in 1984, Fely filed for a divorce in the United States and later married Stephen Micklus in 1988. Since 1988, she has become a US citizen.

Issue:
Was the divorce obtained by Fely in the United States valid in the Philippines?

Ruling:
No. At the time Fely acquired the divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Hence, Article 15 of the Civil Code still applies to her, which states
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.
Since divorce is not recognized in the Philippines, the divorce obtained by Fely abroad is not valid.

In addition, the Court ruled that Article 26, paragraph 2, which provides
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
does not apply in this case because it was only in 1988, four years after she obtained the divorce, that Fely became an American citizen. The provision only applies to mixed marriages where one of the parties is a foreigner at the time the divorce was acquired.

Hence, Fely and Rederick are still considered married in the Philippines.